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MAKING PREPAID SAFE FOR CONSUMERS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE AND REGULATION E PROTECTIONS 
Catherine Lee Wilson* 
General purpose reloadable prepaid cards are part of a larger trend to-
ward a cashless society.  This market offers significant benefits to both tra-
ditional depository institutions and new non-bank entrants in the payments 
industry.  Electronic transfers significantly reduce the costs associated with 
paper-based payment systems.  To balance the benefits received by pay-
ment providers, consumer protections must be established to prevent con-
sumers from becoming the sole bearers of the risks inherent in any payment 
system.  Simple protections, those traditionally afforded to mainstream 
banking clients using checking accounts and debit cards, must be adopted 
for the GPR prepaid product to ensure long-term product safety for con-
sumers.  GPR prepaid cards are a new product, so deposit insurance should 
simply be extended to maintain the historical principles underlying deposit 
insurance.  Likewise, the extension of Regulation E protections to GPR 
prepaid cards would simply complete work initiated by the Federal Reserve 
eighteen years ago.  Both the EFTA and Dodd-Frank give the CFPB the au-
thority to extend these consumer protections.  Part I of this Article will 
provide a brief overview of the prepaid card industry and consumer use of 
the GPR prepaid product.  In Part II, the Article outlines the gaps in the 
regulatory scheme for prepaid cards and highlights the initial steps federal 
regulators have taken to close the gaps.  Part III outlines reasons for ex-
tending consumer protections to GPR prepaid cards by illustrating that con-
sumers are unable to protect against risks inherent in GPR prepaid card 
programs.  Finally, Part IV outlines the existing statutory provisions giving 
the CFPB broad authority to regulate GPR prepaid cards and includes an 
analysis of recent proposed legislation that would provide additional sup-
port to the CFPB’s work to ensure the safety and transparency of the gen-
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eral purpose reloadable card for consumers.  This section highlights the 
CFPB’s broad power under Dodd-Frank to regulate consumer financial 
products to insure the consistent application of federal consumer protection 
laws.  Ultimately, consumer safety and transparency goals will be support-
ed by the CFPB’s comprehensive regulation of GPR prepaid cards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The general purpose reloadable (“GPR”) prepaid card is the fastest 
growing consumer financial product in the market.  The funds loaded on 
GPR prepaid cards more than doubled between 2009 and 2012, growing to 
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$65 billion in 2012.1  Prepaid card payments are growing faster than credit, 
debit and check payments.2  Of the 9.2 million prepaid card payments in 
2012, 34% were made with a GPR prepaid card.3  The Federal Reserve’s 
finding that consumers are using GPR prepaid cards and debit cards in sim-
ilar types of transactions, supports the market’s understanding that GPR 
prepaid cards are increasingly used by consumers as a substitute for a tradi-
tional checking account.4 
Although unbanked and underbanked households in America utilize 
prepaid cards,5 GPR prepaid cards are used by a broad cross-section of 
Americans.  With over 3.5 million Americans living in zip codes situated 
more than ten miles from a bank branch6 and with many merchants’ reluc-
 
 1.  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHY AMERICANS USE PREPAID CARDS: A SURVEY 
OF CARDHOLDERS’ MOTIVATIONS AND VIEWS 1 (2014) [hereinafter PEW, WHY AMERICANS 
USE PREPAID CARDS], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ 
pcs_assets/2014/PrepaidCardsSurveyReportpdf.pdf.  Mercator Advisory Group, Inc. reports 
that the money loaded onto general purpose reloadable prepaid cards tripled from 2009 to 
2012, with $76.7 billion loaded onto the cards in 2012.  Odysseas Papadimitriou, Debit 
Card & Prepaid Card Market Penetration, CARDHUB BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:23 AM), 
http://www.cardhub.com/edu/market-size/. 
 2.  Between 2006 and 2012, consumer use of prepaid cards increased by 18.5% per 
year, faster than all other payment types.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: RECENT AND LONG-TERM TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2000-2012 37 & Ex. 15 (2014).  First Data analyzes payment trends by 
payment type and offers insights on consumer spending each month.  First Data’s June 2014 
report indicates that prepaid cards were the fastest growing non-cash payment type in terms 
of use and dollar volume in June 2014.  Prepaid Cards No. 1 in Growth for June, ATM 
MARKETPLACE (July 14, 2014), http://www.atmmarketplace.com/news/prepaid-cards-no-1-
in-growth-for-june/. 
 3.  BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 2, at 37.  In the Federal Reserve Study, the “prepaid 
card” category included private-label prepaid cards (except for transportation), general-
purpose prepaid cards and electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards.  
 4.  Prepaid Cards No. 1 in Growth for June, supra note 2. 
 5.  Susan Herbst-Murphy, Improving Experience in the Prepaid Card Industry: A Cus-
tomer Service Workshop, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Pa-
per 14-01, 2014), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/consumer-credit-and-payments 
/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2014/D-2014-Prepaid-Cards.pdf (ex-
ploring the customer service challenges associated with government-sponsored prepaid card 
programs designed to provide previously unbanked individuals with access to electronic 
banking services); see also BLACK ECON. COUNCIL, ET. AL., FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR 
THE UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED THROUGH PREPAID CARDS (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0019-0059 (responding to the 
CFPB’s request for comments, suggesting that prepaid cards, if properly regulated, could 
become the preferred payment instrument for households under age 25 and households at or 
below 120 percent of the median income line). 
 6.  Senator Elizabeth Warren, Keynote Address at the Financial Services and the Post 
Office Conference (July 16, 2014), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/events/ 
financial-services-and-the-post-office; see also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, The Geogra-
phy of Banks and Post Offices, at 6 (July 16, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media 
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tance to accept paper checks, Americans are forced to adjust to a changing 
reality about how financial services are provided.7  Increasingly, Americans 
are relying on nonbank providers of consumer financial products.8 
Despite the increased need for payment alternatives and rapid adop-
tion of this popular consumer financial product, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is just beginning to craft comprehensive fed-
eral regulation for GPR prepaid cards.9  The proposed regulations come af-
 
/Assets/2014/07/FIN_Presentation-of-Pew-Research--The-Geography-of-Banks-and-Post-
Offices.pdf (“10% [of 74,000 Census tracts] do not have a bank branch within five miles of 
their population center”). 
 7.  At a hearing hosted by the Senate Banking Committee on the prepaid market, Jen-
nifer Tescher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Financial Services 
Innovation, described the change as follows: 
Prepaid cards are virtual bank accounts, and they represent a truly new point of 
financial access at a time when access is diminishing.  Prepaid cards function 
like electronic bank accounts without checks; consumers load funds on the card 
and, with the majority of prepaid cards, can spend only what they load. 
Examining Issues in the Prepaid Card Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. 
& Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 
(2012) (statement of Jennifer Tescher, President & CEO, Center for Financial Services In-
novation).  See generally Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004) 
(arguing that technological innovation can help the poor to access financial services); 
STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., COMMENT ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS 
(REGULATION E) AND GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2012/07/ftc-staff-comment-
consumer-financial-protection (discussing the lack of protection in some of the prepaid card 
payment methods). 
 8.  Warren, supra note 6 (“Twenty-eight percent of all households, 68 million people 
rely on nonbank financial services like check cashing or payday lending and the costs of 
these services [are] extraordinary.”).  At the conference, Sen. Warren expressed her support 
for a proposal to use the U.S. Postal Service to offer financial services to consumers who do 
not use traditional, mainstream banking accounts. 
 9.  Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the 
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 79 Fed. Reg. 77102 (proposed December 23, 2014) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1005 and 1026); Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, Prepared Remarks at Prepaid Cards Field Hearing (May 23, 2012) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-at-
prepaid-cards-fieldhearing) (stating that federal regulation does not reach GPR prepaid 
cards); Press Release, Senator Carolyn B. Maloney, Maloney: 5 Years Later, Credit CARD 
Act Has Saved Consumers Billions (May 22, 2014) (“I also believe we must take a look at 
the growing use of prepaid cards, which are not subject to comprehensive federal regula-
tions.  I am hopeful that my colleagues in Congress will work with me to build on the great 
success of the Credit CARD Act with additional protections.”); see also Developing the 
Framework for Safe and Efficient Mobile Payments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Sandra Braunstein, Dir., 
Div. of Consumer Cmty. Affairs, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve) (explaining the use 
of the mobile phone to make payments that are charged to a credit card or withdrawn from a 
bank account); Philip Keitel, Federal Regulation of the Prepaid Card Industry: Costs, Bene-
fits and Changing Industry Dynamics (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Ctr.,  
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ter nearly two years of concentrated efforts to study the GPR prepaid mar-
ket.  In May 2012, the CFPB issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“ANPR”) seeking information about a variety of topics relat-
ed to the prepaid market.10  A few days after issuing the ANPR, at a town 
hall meeting in Durham, North Carolina, community leaders and the pre-
paid industry offered insights about the market and consumer use of pre-
paid cards.11  The wealth of information gathered by the CFPB after the 
town hall meeting about consumer reactions to the fee disclosure forms and 
industry viewpoints articulated in comments to the ANPR,12 along with 
empirical studies conducted by other federal agencies,13 will inform the 
 
Discussion Paper 11-03, Apr. 8-9, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1908336 (summarizing the presentations about the prepaid card 
industry). 
 10.  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30923, 30923-30925 (pro-
posed May 24, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1005).  The CFPB received approximately 
225 comments in response to the ANPR on prepaid cards.  The comments submitted in re-
sponse to the ANPR may be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov 
/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=25;dct=PS;D=CFPB-2012-0019. 
 11.  See Live From Durham, NC!, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 23, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-durham-nc/ (summarizing a field hearing 
on prepaid cards). 
 12.  The CFPB field-tested a variety of prepaid disclosures aimed at providing a uni-
form disclosure of fee information for consumers.  Eric Goldberg, Prepaid Cards: Help De-
sign a New Disclosure, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/prepaid-cards-help-design-a-new-disclosure/ (includ-
ing pictures of the model disclosure boxes); Mike Ferullo, CFPB Testing Uniform Fee Dis-
closures for Prepaid Cards: Proposal Due Late Spring, BLOOMBERG BNA BANKING DAILY 
(Mar. 19, 2014).  Green Dot and others tested the disclosure boxes.  See, e.g., Pat Dulnier, 
Prepaid Debit Card Issuers to Test Fee-Disclosure Box, BANKCREDITNEWS (Mar. 14, 
2012), http://bankcreditnews.com/news/prepaid-debit-card-issuers-to-test-fee-disclosure-
box/ (discussing the motivation behind fee disclosure boxes).  
 13.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMERS AND MOBILE 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 2014 [hereinafter, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, MOBILE FIN. SERVICES], 
(2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-and-mobile-financial-
services-report- 201403.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON GOVERNMENT-ADMINISTERED, GENERAL-USE PREPAID CARDS (2014) [herein-
after, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO CONGRESS], 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2014_Prepaid_Cards_ Final.pdf (reporting 
as required annually by Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act, providing Congress with de-
tailed statistics about cards used for a variety of federal and state government benefits); 
STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF CONS. PROT., IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (REGULATION 
E) AND GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-concerning-electronic-fund-transfers/120730cfpbstaff 
comment.pdf; Susan Herbst-Murphy, Improving Experience in the Prepaid Card Industry: 
A Customer Service Workshop (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Ctr., Discus-
sion Paper 14-1, 2014), http://www.phil.frb.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-
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CFPB’s evaluation of the need for comprehensive regulation.  While wait-
ing for the agency action, The Pew Charitable Trusts published several re-
ports detailing various aspects of the prepaid market.14  In addition, The 
Pew Charitable Trusts and the Center for Financial Services Innovation 
have both collaborated with industry leaders to bring changes to the market 
in advance of the proposed rulemaking.15 
Market driven reforms in recent years by industry leaders clearly have 
benefitted consumers, but comprehensive regulation is needed to ensure 
long-term product safety for consumers.16  The CFPB exercised its clear au-
 
cards-center /publications/discussion-papers/2014/D-2014-Prepaid-Cards.pdf; Philip Keitel, 
A Prepaid Case Study: Ready Credit’s General-Purpose & Transit-Fare Programs (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper, 2012), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussionpapers/2012/D-2012-April-Ready-Credit.pdf (describing the 
business model to market both transit and general use prepaid cards outlined by Ready 
Credit Corporation at an August 22, 2011 workshop); Zhu Wang & Alexander L. Wolman, 
Payment Choice and the Future of Currency: Insights from Two Billion Retail Transactions 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper 14-09, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2420420 (using three years of detailed 
transactional data from a specific merchant to forecast a decline in the need for currency). 
 14.  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD UP ON PREPAID 
CARDS: CHANGES IN GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS MAKE THEM MORE 
LIKE CHECKING ACCOUNTS BUT WITHOUT IMPORTANT PROTECTIONS (2014) [hereinafter PEW, 
CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD UP], http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy 
/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2014/PrepaidCardsStillLoadedReportpdf.pdf (providing a com-
prehensive review of the features on general purpose reloadable prepaid cards); THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, LOADED WITH UNCERTAINTY: ARE PREPAID CARDS A SMART 
ALTERNATIVE TO CHECKING ACCOUNTS (2012) [hereinafter, PEW, LOADED WITH 
UNCERTAINTY], http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/ 
PrepaidCheckingreportpdf.pdf?la=en (surveying the various fee structures and disclosures 
for general reloadable prepaid cards); PEW, WHY AMERICANS USE PREPAID CARDS, supra 
note 1. 
 15.  In June 2012, the Center for Financial Services (“CFSI”) issued a “Compass Guide 
to Prepaid” outlining four principles or guidelines for improving the quality of the general-
purpose reloadable prepaid product.  The principles include:  (1) Embrace Inclusion; (2) 
Build Trust; (3) Promote Success; and (4) Create Opportunity.  The CFSI also outlined prac-
tices, at three different levels, that will uphold the four principles.  See Beth Brockland & 
Romy Parzick, The Compass Guide to Prepaid, CENTER FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INNOVATION (2012), http://www.cfsinnovation.com/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=d5fbc 
416-f7c3-40b7-b102-e6a26f1746f7 (providing an expanded explanation of the principles). 
VISA, the largest network participant in the general reloadable prepaid card industry, an-
nounced a program designed to identify general reloadable prepaid cards that meet or ex-
ceed a set of consumer protection measures suggested by consumer advocates.  See Visa 
Elevates Prepaid Cards to New Level of Simplicity, Protections and Opportunity, VISA 
(June 3, 2014), available at http://investor.visa.com/news/news-details/2014/Visa-Elevates-
Prepaid-Cards-to-New-Level-of-Simplicity-Protections-and-Opportunity/default.aspx (an-
nouncing an effort to improve cards by providing a “stamp of approval” for cards that meet 
certain requirements). 
 16.  Cf. Mark Budnitz, et al., Deceptive Claims for Prepaid Telephone Cards and the 
ARTICLE 5 (WILSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:51 AM 
2015] MAKING PREPAID SAFE FOR CONSUMERS 931 
 
thority under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) to amend Regula-
tion E17 to require certain disclosures for GPR prepaid cards, to establish 
procedures for error resolution and to set limits on consumer liability for 
unauthorized transactions.18  However, in addition to Regulation E protec-
tions included in the proposed regulations, the CFPB should use its authori-
ty under Dodd-Frank to require federal deposit insurance for funds loaded 
on GPR prepaid cards.  Hopefully, the CFPB will safeguard consumers’ 
use of this new consumer financial product by issuing regulations requiring 
these basic protections. 
Part I of this Article will provide a brief overview of the prepaid card 
industry and consumer use of the GPR prepaid product.  In Part II, the Ar-
ticle outlines the regulatory gaps for prepaid cards and highlights the initial 
steps federal regulators have taken to close the gaps.  Part III outlines rea-
sons for extending consumer protections to GPR prepaid cards by illustrat-
ing that consumers are unable to protect against risks inherent in GPR pre-
paid card programs.  Finally, Part IV outlines the existing statutory 
provisions giving the CFPB broad authority to regulate GPR prepaid cards 
and includes an analysis of recent proposed legislation supporting the 
CFPB’s work to ensure the safety and transparency of the general purpose 
reloadable card for consumers.  This section highlights the CFPB’s broad 
power under Dodd-Frank to regulate consumer financial products to insure 
the consistent application of federal consumer protection laws.  Ultimately, 
consumer safety and transparency goals will be supported by the CFPB’s 
comprehensive regulation of GPR prepaid cards.19 
 
Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2006) (calling for federal regulation of 
telephone prepaid cards based on consumer experiences with the telephone prepaid market 
and finding that because consumers did not have adequate information to protect themselves 
due to ineffective or lack of disclosures and the inability of the industry to engage in effec-
tive self-regulation, national regulation establishing a floor for disclosures and substantive 
protections and consumer remedies should be established).  
     17.   Regulation E, promulgated under the Electronic Funds Transfers Act, provides a 
fairly comprehensive regulatory scheme for consumer electronic payments.   Debit card 
payments and other non-card based electronic payments are subject to the regulation if a 
consumer account is utilized.   
 18.  See generally Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
77 (2013) (discussing the internet and mobile payments and outlining the regulatory gaps 
for payment systems utilizing mobile technologies); Air M. Cohen, Note, Protecting the 
Underserved: Extending the Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regulation E to Prepaid 
Debit Cards, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 215 (2010).  Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, The Eco-
nomics and Regulation of Network Branded Prepaid Cards, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1477 (2013) 
(claiming that consumer protection concerns are minimal); Sarah Jane Hughes, Federal 
Payroll, Gift and Prepaid Card Developments: FDIC Deposit Insurance Eligibility and the 
Credit CARD Act of 2009, 65 BUS. LAW. 261 (2009) (outlining federal standards established 
to preempt state laws regarding the regulation of prepaid cards). 
 19.  Cordray, supra note 9 (federal regulation does not reach GPR prepaid cards) 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE PREPAID INDUSTRY 
General purpose reloadable prepaid cards have become a popular 
payment product in recent months.20  Chase, American Express, NetSpend, 
Green Dot and Wal-Mart are just a few of the entities offering a GPR pre-
paid card.21  GPR prepaid cards are associated with a payments network, 
Visa, MasterCard or American Express, and can be used at any location ac-
cepting cards on that network.22  The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s bi-
annual Survey of Consumer Payment Choice evidences the growth in the 
prepaid market.  The survey reveals that one-third of those surveyed in 
2010 had a “prepaid card” and that they loaded the card two times a month 
with an average of $79.23 
A. Defining the GPR prepaid card 
General purpose reloadable prepaid cards are part of a large prepaid 
industry.  Prepaid products may be structured for particular markets includ-
ing travel, health, campus or government benefits.24  This Article focuses 
on the open loop card, identified in the CFPB’s ANPR, funded initially 
with government benefits from a federal or state agency, with pay from an 
employer or with cash from the cardholder/consumer.  The card is re-
 
(“Over the course of this rulemaking [on prepaid cards], we are going to focus on two key 
issues:  safety and transparency.”). 
 20.  Press Release, Senator Mark Warner, Sen. Warner Urges Banks to Offer Better 
Consumer Protections for Users of Prepaid Cards (January 9, 2014), 
http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/mobile/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=12
c3bb8b-22fc-4692-8c37-3fd30526555d (“At nearly $700 billion in sales each year, prepaid 
cards are one of the fastest growing parts of the financial industry.”).  
 21.  Chase refers to its GPR prepaid card as “Liquid” and views these customers as im-
portant members of the Chase family; Bank of America, in contrast, elected to adopt a spe-
cial bank account rather than invest in a GPR prepaid card program.  Michael Corkery & 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Lenders Offer Low-Cost Services for the Unbanked, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/offering-small-fees-banks-cater-
to-low-income-customers/?_r=0. 
 22.  GPR prepaid cards and open-loop cards are distinct from their cousin, the closed 
loop or non-reloadable prepaid card.  The latter can be used only at a specific store or chain, 
such as Target or Walgreens.  Generally, non-reloadable prepaid cards are issued in small 
denominations and given as graduation, birthday and holiday gifts. 
 23.  KEVIN FOSTER, ET. AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE 2010 SURVEY OF 
CONSUMER CHOICE, RESEARCH DATA REPORT NO. 13-2, at 25, 37, 58, (2013), available at 
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2013/rdr1302.pdf. 
 24.  Mercator Advisory Group’s review of the industry suggests that there may be as 
many as eleven different categories of closed and open loop prepaid cards and sixteen dif-
ferent market segments for open loop prepaid cards.  MERCATOR ADVISORY GROUP, 
DEBUNKING MYTHS OF PREPAID 12 (2013), http://www.paymentsjournal.com/Download 
.aspx?id=16813. 
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loadable automatically through direct deposit (e.g., an electronic transfer of 
weekly payroll), or at a retail location participating in the network.25  Some 
GPR prepaid programs are experimenting with reloads using remote depos-
it capture technology.  After loading, the GPR prepaid card is used for re-
curring household expenses such as groceries, rent and utilities, or for un-
expected transactions such as a car repair.  This Article focuses on GPR 
prepaid cards, used or marketed for use as a substitute for a traditional 
checking account and drawing on funds in an account maintained with a 
bank or a non-bank entity whenever the card or its sixteen-digit number (or 
other code) is used to authorize a transaction.26 
 
 25.  Lewis Goodwin, Chief Executive Officer, Green Dot Bank, Testimony at the 
Emerging Payments Task Force of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 16, 
2014), available at http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Pages/phmay16.aspx (explaining a 
new real-time program allowing consumers to reload a Green Dot prepaid card). 
 26.  Popular examples include Chase’s Liquid Card and American Express’s Bluebird 
card.  At this time, prepaid cards may be used in a brick and mortar store, online, or to fund 
expenditures within a mobile application.  Starbucks’ mobile application is an example of a 
mobile application allowing customers to use funds loaded onto a closed loop, reloadable 
prepaid card.  See, e.g., Braden Lammers, Why Your Starbucks Card is a Threat to Banks, 
BUSINESS FIRST, (March 17, 2014), http://www.bizjournals.com/luisville/news/2014/03/17/ 
why-your-starbucks-card-is-a-threat-to-banks.html (citing an Accenture report that banks’ 
market share might be “up for grabs” as consumers shift to digital banking products). 
   However, variations using mobile technology closely resemble transactions utiliz-
ing a physical GPR prepaid card in the current market.  For example, a GPR prepaid card 
could be linked to Google Wallet, Skrill or Square in the same manner that one links a debit 
card, credit card or bank account.  In this instance, the funds loaded onto the GPR prepaid 
card, bearing a network logo (VISA, MasterCard, Discover or American Express), are still 
the payment mechanism.  Whether used online, within a mobile app, or in conjunction with 
close-proximity technologies in a brick and mortar store, the funds loaded on the card are 
used to settle the transaction.  Any anticipated regulations should apply in these contexts 
because the funds loaded onto the card are still the funding source for the transaction.   
   In contrast, some online (or brick and mortar) transactions are (or will be) funded 
with money held by a non-bank, such as PayPal or Dwolla.  In these instances, the consumer 
places funds into a PayPal account and uses those funds over a period of time to make 
online purchases.  Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEXAS 
L. REV. 681, 696 n.88 (2005) (outlining the regulatory gap when an online account used to 
fund an online purchase transaction with a credit card, loaded funds or the consumer’s bank 
account).  Currently, the contractual relationship between the consumer and the non-bank 
entity govern the error resolution procedures and liability limits for unauthorized use.  In 
some instances, these contracts state that the funds in the account are not protected by FDIC 
insurance.  These relationships might be subject to any rules issued in response to the 
ANPR.  As articulated by Professor Ramasastry: 
To the extent that P2P funds transfers out of non-bank accounts are covered, it is 
hard to distinguish between a prepaid debit card and a PayPal funds transfer.  In 
both, consumers are accessing a funded account (one linked to a device, the oth-
er stored online) to pay for goods and services . . . .  Is there really a distinction 
to be made between a PayPal account and a prepaid debit card?  
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A GPR prepaid card may be acquired in a matter of minutes without 
the need for an extensive credit check.  A card-based payment is conven-
ient because sufficient amounts of cash may be difficult or risky to carry or 
because the consumer frequents merchants unwilling to accept paper 
checks.  The cards offer easy access to funds to pay bills or to make pur-
chases at a local vendor or online.  Some cards give cardholders access to 
cash at an ATM.  For the unbanked, the GPR prepaid cardholder eliminates 
the need to frequent a check-cashing store.  Thus, in many ways, the GPR 
prepaid card provides a convenient payment mechanism in this cashless so-
ciety.27 
From the funding perspective, GPR prepaid cards usually represent a 
low cost mechanism to distribute funds and eliminate many of the costs as-
sociated with distributing those funds.  Increasingly, employers are offering 
direct deposit to a prepaid card account.28  Likewise, government benefits 
offered by federal and state agencies, including unemployment, social secu-
rity, veterans’ benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
(“TANF”) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) ben-
efits, are made often times electronically, requiring that the recipient have a 
means to accept the benefits.29  The GPR prepaid card issued by the gov-
ernment agency or another approved issuer eliminates the costs associated 
with mailing.  Although some cards do not have stated limits, most GPR 
 
Anita Ramasastry, Confusion and Convergence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in 
Error Resolution Appropriate? 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 852 (2008). 
 27.  DAVID WOLMAN, THE END OF MONEY: COUNTERFEITERS, PREACHERS, TECHIES, 
DREAMERS—AND THE CASHLESS SOCIETY (2012); Tu, supra note 18, at 77-78 (discussing 
the internet and mobile payments and outlining the regulatory gaps for payment systems 
utilizing mobile technologies). 
 28.  Indeed, it would be a violation of the Electronic Funds Transfers Act to require 
employees to accept wages on a prepaid card selected by the employer.  15 U.S.C. § 1693k. 
Thus, prepaid must be one of the options available for payroll.  The Act, however, does not 
prohibit an employer limiting the prepaid option to an issuer selected by the employer. 
 29.  GPR prepaid cards are also used by colleges and universities as a mechanism to 
disburse financial aid funds.  ROHIT CHOPRA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BANKING ON 
CAMPUS FORUM, slide 2 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 201309_cfpb_banking-
on-campus-forum.pdf (describing the agency’s findings from a 2012 Request for Infor-
mation Regarding Financial Products Marketed to Students Enrolled in Institutions of High-
er Learning).  Loan proceeds have been issued on prepaid cards in other contexts as well.  
The OCC took enforcement action against a Florida bank when it issued prepaid cards load-
ed with funds from a payday loan.  They explained that the arrangement between the bank 
and the payday lender presented a risk to the bank and issued Agreement by and Between 
Urban Trust Bank, Lake Mary, Florida and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, No. 
2012-190 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter, Urban Trust Bank Agreement], available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2012-190.pdf. See also Sheryl Harris, 
OCC smacks bank for issuing prepaid cards for payday lender: Plain Dealing, 
CLEVELAND.ORG (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/consumeraffairs/index.ssf/ 
2012/09/occ_smacks_bank_for_issuing_pr.html.   
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prepaid cards allow a cardholder to carry a balance of $10,000 and two 
cards have a maximum value load of $15,000.30  While the card balances 
could be high, most cards set daily load limits (generally between $2000 
and $5000), single transactions (up to $5000), cash withdrawal limits from 
ATMs (many set at $500) and in-person cash withdrawal limits (between 
$400 and $5000).31 
         There are numerous participants in a GPR prepaid card chain.32 
 
 
Figure 133 
 
A diagram, Figure 1 above, illustrates the relationships between the various 
bank and non-bank entities involved in the typical prepaid card program.  
In addition to the card issuer, payment network, merchant acquirer and pro-
cessor present in any credit or debit card program, prepaid card programs 
 
 30.  Douglas King, Have Anti-Money Laundering Measures Kept Pace with Rapid 
Growth of GPR Prepaid Cards? 1, 8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Retail Payments Risk 
Forum Working Paper, 2013), https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/rprf/ 
rprf_pubs/130117wp.pdf?la=en (“Of the thirteen programs that disclose a maximum card 
value, eleven of these programs have a maximum that is $10,000 or less and two programs 
have a maximum of $15,000.  Of the two programs that do not disclose a card value limit, 
one program’s cardholder terms and agreement states that ‘the maximum value of your card 
may be restricted.’”). 
 31.  For a full discussion of these features, see PEW, CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD 
UP, supra note 14.  
 32.  Philip Keitel, Insolvency Risk in the Network-Branded Prepaid-Card Value Chain 
1, 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Payments Card Center, Discussion Paper, 2011) (reporting 
on a workshop to examine the risk of insolvency in the prepaid marketplace), 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/comsumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2011/D-2011-September-NBPCA-Keitel.pdf; 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE FOR A RISK BASED APPROACH: PREPAID CARDS, 
MOBILE PAYMENTS AND INTERNET-BASED PAYMENT SERVICES 6 (2013), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/guidance-rba-npps.pdf (making recom-
mendations to ensure that prepaid cards are not used for anti-money laundering and terrorist 
financing).  
 33.  King, supra note 30, at 3  (Figure 1 from this working paper is part of a full discus-
sion about the relationships between the participants and various risks in a prepaid card pro-
gram). 
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also rely on a program manager, a distributer and a retailer for the issuance 
of the cards.  While non-bank entities initially led the development of this 
product, major banks are now some of the largest issuers of GPR prepaid 
cards.34  Bank participation in this industry increased after the Durbin 
Amendment to the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (“Dodd-Frank”) limited fee revenues from debit cards.35  Exemp-
tions in Dodd-Frank for general purpose reloadable prepaid cards36 allow 
traditional banks to recoup revenues lost under the Durbin Amendment by 
charging higher interchange fees on prepaid card transactions.37  Given the 
significant growth in the market in recent months and changing de-
 
 34.  Find the Best Prepaid Debit Card for You, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 13, 2014, 3:58 
PM), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/best-prepaid-debit-cards.aspx. 
 35.  See Zywicki, supra note 18, at 1494 & n.94. 
 36.  The Durbin Amendment defines a “general-use prepaid card” as:   
a card or other payment code or device issued by any person that is—  
(i) redeemable multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or automat-
ed teller machines; 
(ii) issued in a requested amount, whether or not that amount may, at the option 
of the issuer, be increased in value or reloaded if requested by the holder; 
(iii) purchased or loaded on a prepaid basis; and 
(iv) honored, upon presentation, by merchants for goods or services, or at auto-
mated teller machines. 
15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(A) (2014); Fumiko Hayashi & Emily Cuddy, General Purpose 
Reloadable Prepaid Cards: Penetration, Use, Fees and Fraud Risks 3 n.4 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Research Working Paper 14-01, 2013) (“Regulation II . . . caps debit 
card interchange fees received by large financial institutions.  Certain types of prepaid cards, 
such as reloadable prepaid cards, are exempt from this interchange fee cap.”).  Dodd-Frank 
exempts cards from the interchange fee rules (1) if the issuer and its affiliates have assets of 
less than $10 billion; (2) the prepaid card is provided to a person pursuant to a government 
payment program and the cardholder can only access the funds or (3) it is a “reloadable gen-
eral-use prepaid card” with certain characteristics.  12 C.F.R. § 235.5.  Specifically, the “re-
loadable general-use prepaid card” is exempt if it is: 
Not issued or approved for use to access or debit any account held by or for the 
benefit of the cardholder (other than a subaccount or other method of recording 
or tracking funds purchased or loaded on the card on a prepaid basis); 
Reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate; and 
The card is the only means of access to the underlying funds, except when all 
remaining funds are provided to the cardholder in a single transaction.   
12 C.F.R. § 235.5(c) (2014).  Accordingly, the card cannot be used for ACH or remittance 
transactions.  However, all cards, including GPR prepaid cards, are subject to the routing 
and exclusivity rules in Dodd-Frank. 
 37.  See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Geoff A. Manne & Julian Morris, Price Controls 
on Payment Card Interchange Fees:  The U.S. Experience 18-20 (George Mason Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 14-18, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446080 (out-
lining the various indirect strategies taken by banks to recoup revenues lost after the Durbin 
Amendment) and Brad G. Hubbard, The Durbin Amendment, Two-Sided Markets, and 
Wealth Transfers: An Examination of Unintended Consequences Three Years Later 48-57 
(May 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285105. 
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mographics, the GPR prepaid card is likely to become an increasingly im-
portant consumer financial product.38 
B. Demographics of the GPR Prepaid Card User 
GPR prepaid cards appeal to a broad cross-section of American 
households.39  Across all income levels, American households are using the 
GPR prepaid card for a variety of purposes.  Many households utilize the 
cards as a substitute for a checking account.40  The card offers a secure 
mechanism to receive a paycheck and pay bills without incurring predatory 
check-cashing fees, money order fees or overdraft charges.  Some 
households utilizing the GPR prepaid card in this fashion are characterized 
as unbanked or underbanked.41  With the number of unbanked and 
underbanked households rising to over 28% of U.S. households––nearly 
sixty eight million adults––the prepaid market offers low-cost or no-cost 
accessibility to funds.42  While some GPR prepaid cardholders do not 
qualify for a traditional checking account, major bank issuers express a 
hope that these customers will become “regular” bank customers.43  Given 
 
     38.   See generally, Susan Herbst-Murphy & Greg Weed, Millennials with Money:  A 
New Look at Who Uses GPR Prepaid Cards 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Payment 
Cards Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 14-3, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2494406 (reporting on market surveys that suggest a “strong 
and growing” GPR prepaid card market skewed “heavily to younger consumers”).  
 39.  According to The Pew Charitable Trusts, prepaid card users are less likely to be 
married, but more likely to be renters, earn less than $25,000, be African American and be 
younger than 50 years of age. PEW, WHY AMERICANS USE PREPAID CARDS, supra note 1, at 
3. 
 40.  See Gadi Dechter & Joe Valenti, It’s Time to Regulate Prepaid Cards as Bank Ac-
counts, AM. BANKER (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/its-time-
to-regulate-prepaid-cards-as-bank-accounts-1054698-1.html (acknowledging that prepaid 
cards are effectively bank accounts). 
 41.  Describing this market, Director Cordray stated: 
[About 9 million American families] are known as the ‘unbanked.’ . . . Another 
21 million are the so-called ‘underbanked’—although they actually have a bank 
account, they often use nonbank products to meet their financial needs.  But the-
se are just labels.  The tens of millions of Americans who bear these labels are 
just hard-working people living paycheck to paycheck . . . . 
Cordray, supra note 9.  For a map identifying the location of unbanked and underbanked 
households in America, see Ethan Geiling, The Most Unbanked Places in America, 
INCLUSIVE ECON. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://cfed.org/newsroom 
/experts/ethan_geiling/the_most_unbanked_places_in_america/index.html. 
 42.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012) (reporting that seventeen million adults are unbanked 
and fifty one million adults are underbanked). 
 43.  See Constance Gustke, Do Big-Bank Prepaid Cards Lead the Pack?, 
BANKRATE.COM (April 7, 2014), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/do-big-bank-
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the ongoing policy concerns related to “unbanked and underbanked 
households,” the GPR prepaid card, with proper consumer protections, 
could serve as a mechanism to move households from “unbanked” to 
“banked.” 
The phrase “unbanked or underbanked” may also refer to 
millennials who have not yet established a formal relationship by opening a 
checking account and obtaining a debit card with a traditional financial 
institution.  These individuals may not wish to place routine expenses on a 
credit card, but they need “plastic” to make purchases online or at retailers 
who do not accept cash.44 
As the prepaid market matures, a variety of new uses will become 
available.  The merger of prepaid cards and mobile services will 
undoubtedly create opportunities for a variety of financial services.  Within 
the mobile environment, the GPR prepaid card could become a virtual card 
accessible from the mobile device or used as the funding source at the time 
of checkout. Although the Federal Reserve’s 2014 Payment Study reveals 
that only 5% of mobile payment users linked a mobile application to a GPR 
prepaid card, consumer concerns about payment security might increase the 
likelihood that prepaid cards, rather than debit cards or credit cards, are 
linked to a mobile application.45 This will allow consumers to enter the 
mobile environment with more confidence and provide further avenues for 
growth of the prepaid industry. 
C. Consumer use of GPR Prepaid Cards 
The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study, released on July 24, 
2014, contains the most recent statistics about the use of prepaid cards in 
the United States.46  The study is particularly insightful due to its focus on 
 
prepaid-cards-lead-the-pack.aspx (stating that, according to a Consumers Union staff attor-
ney, consumers are turning to prepaid cards due to financial difficulty).  
 44.  Studies confirm that most prepaid card households use a GPR prepaid card in addi-
tion to a traditional checking account to manage the household finances. PEW, WHY 
AMERICANS USE PREPAID CARDS, supra note 1, at 4, 7 (observing that 59% of prepaid card 
users also have a checking account and noting that of those 59%, 77% consider their check-
ing account as their primary mechanism for managing money);  see also Ann Carrns, Pre-
paid Debit Cards May Augment Bank Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014, at B5 (citing  
PEW, WHY AMERICANS USE PREPAID CARDS, supra note 1, to illustrate that many prepaid 
card users have a checking account).  If the household utilizes both a checking account and 
a prepaid card, the prepaid card may be a budgeting mechanism offering the ability to limit 
spending in different categories, a financial education tool for teens in the household or a 
mechanism to send funds to college-age children living away from home. 
     45.    BOARD OF GOVERNORS, MOBILE FIN. SERVICES, supra note 13, at 20. 
 46.  BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 2.  Initiated in 2001, this is the fifth installment of 
the Federal Reserve’s triennial study on payments.  The Federal Reserve collects data from 
several surveys and captures business and consumer payments with a variety of payment 
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noncash payments.  When conducting the study, the Federal Reserve 
distinguishes between credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards carrying a 
network brand, electronic benefit transfer cards (with government benefits) 
and private label prepaid cards, typically issued by merchants and “only for 
use at locations owned by the issuing business.”47  Based on a review of the 
estimated 159.1 million GPR prepaid card in force during 2012, each 
prepaid card averages 10 payments per month.48  Moreover, a graph from 
the report, Figure 2 below, showing the distribution of payments based on 
the amount of the transaction, indicates that prepaid card use mirrors debit 
card use during the applicable period, thus further supporting the 
observation that consumers view GPR prepaid cards as a near substitute for 
the debit card connected to the traditional checking account.49 
 
Figure 250 
A long-term study by Hayashi and Cuddy reflects the changes in 
consumer use of general purpose reloadable prepaid cards.51  Hayashi and 
Cuddy examined over three million transactions on NetSpend GPR prepaid 
cards activated between July 1, 2011 and June 30, 2012.  NetSpend 
permitted four types of transactions with the cards:  (1) purchases; (2) 
ATM cash withdrawals; (3) bill payments; and (4) person-to-person funds 
 
mechanisms. 
 47.  Id. at 15 & fig. 7. 
 48.  Id. at 16. 
 49.  Id. at 26. 
      50.   Id.  
 51.  Hayashi & Cuddy, supra note 35, at 18. 
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transfers between NetSpend prepaid cardholders.52  The study included 
observations about the number and amount of PIN and signature 
transactions, the socio-demographic characteristics of the cardholders; the 
average monthly fees paid by the users and fraud rates.  Hayashi and 
Cuddy found that cards with direct deposits were used longer and those 
with direct deposits by governments had a longer life span than those 
funded by direct deposits by non-government entities.53  Further, 
cardholders made an average of seven purchase transactions per month 
valued at $303.54  The researchers also observed differences in PIN-based 
transactions based on fees.  Specifically, for cardholders paying a monthly 
fee, PIN transactions exceeded signature transactions by about ten 
percentage points.55 
A different study––a six year study of 280 million prepaid card 
transactions made with more than three million cards from a dozen 
different prepaid card programs––revealed that open loop cards with 
regularly scheduled loads remain active for longer periods of time.56  Like 
Hayashi and Cuddy, Wilshusen found that prepaid cards loaded with 
regularly scheduled direct deposits were active “for much longer periods 
and are used much more intensively by the cardholder.”57  The data 
revealed that cash withdrawals amount for a significant number of 
transactions on the prepaid card.58  The researchers also captured some 
revenue information concluding that the revenues varied from a few dollars 
to $12 a month depending on the prepaid cards and that cards with longer 
active periods generated more revenue for the card issuer.59  While the 
researchers warned that the study could not be generalized to all users of 
prepaid cards,60 the study confirmed the increased use of GPR prepaid 
cards and provides a framework for future studies. 
Economist Oz Shy looked more closely at how buyers allocated 
spending between debit cards, credit cards and prepaid cards using the 
 
 52.  Id. at 22. 
 53.  Id. at 15. 
 54.  Id. at 26. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Stephanie M. Wilshusen et. al., Consumers’ Use of Prepaid Cards: A Transaction-
Based Analysis 11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,,Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Paper 12-
02, 2012), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2012/D-2012-August-Prepaid.pdf. 
 57.  Id. at 42. 
 58.  Id. at 6-7, 34. 
 59.  Id. at 31, 41. 
 60.  Id. at 43. 
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2012 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice.61  Shy found that payment card 
users tend to engage in “single-homing,” a term used to describe how 
consumers allocate their transactions between card types.62  Shy found that 
consumers do not view the various card types as interchangeable; rather 
they tend to select one card-type and use it for all transactions.63  According 
to this survey, consumers tended to concentrate their purchases on the 
preferred card regardless of the volume or value of the transactions.64  The 
study speculated as to reasons for this consumer behavior (e.g., the 
preferred card may contain preferred payment features), but did not reach 
any conclusions.  The study found that only 2.9% of the surveyed 
consumers concentrated their payments on a prepaid card; however, 
consumers that preferred prepaid cards concentrated 86.3% of all their 
transactions on the prepaid card.65  In other words, those that use prepaid 
cards frequently rely on the prepaid card for all transactions.  In contrast, 
consumers that concentrate their payments on debit or credit cards are less 
likely to use the preferred card for all payments.66  Because this study 
suggests that consumers that prefer GPR prepaid cards will use them 
extensively, it underscores the importance of bringing comprehensive 
consumer protections to the product. 
D. The Confusing & Predatory Fee Structures 
Consumer confusion about fees abounds.  The fees associated with 
GPR prepaid cards are as varied as the brands.  Each card operates under a 
different fee schedule.  Fees may be incurred for activation, balance 
inquiries, ATM use, loading funds, replacing cards or speaking to customer 
service representatives.  Some cards eliminate some fees when the 
cardholder establishes a recurring direct deposit.  And while it is difficult to 
understand, some prepaid cards charge overdraft fees.  According to a July 
2014 report, prepaid card issuers collected $502 million in fees from 
government administered prepaid card programs during 2013, with 35% of 
the total coming from cardholder fees.67  Although this is a small sample of 
the market, it demonstrates the importance of fee income in the business 
strategy. 
 
 61.  Oz Shy, How Many Cards Do You Use? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working 
Paper No. 13-13, 2013), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2013/ 
wp1313.pdf. 
 62.  Id. at 1. 
 63.  Id. at 8. 
 64.  Id.. 
 65.  Id. at 8, 12. 
 66.  Id. at 8. 
 67.  BOARD  OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 13, at 1. 
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            Recent reports suggest that with increased competition in the market 
the fee structures might change.68  For example, in November 2013, 
American Express announced that money could be loaded on its Serve 
prepaid product at no cost.69  Similarly, funds may be loaded on Bluebird at 
any Wal-Mart store.70  Other issuers modified programs to allow consumers 
to withdraw cash at an ATM without cost.71  With these market-driven 
changes some GPR prepaid cards are a better value than checking accounts 
at a traditional bank.  These market changes together with a new fee 
disclosure format should ease consumer confusion about fees.72 
II. REGULATORY GAPS: PROTECTIONS NEEDED FOR GPR 
PREPAID CARDS 
Although proposed regulations for the cards are pending, issuers of 
GPR prepaid cards and their affiliates are already subject to a number of 
federal and state regulations.  For example, issuers of prepaid cards and 
others in the prepaid chain must comply with anti-money laundering 
regulations issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”),73 supervisory guidance provided by the Office of the 
 
 68.  See Jane Adler, Prepaid’s Big Makeover, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/4602 (detailing the efforts to expand the cus-
tomer base and reduce prices of prepaid cards); PEW, CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD UP, 
supra note 14, at 2-3 (“More cards are charging monthly fees but not charging other transac-
tion-based fees, such as point-of-sale or customer service fees.  This fee structure more 
closely resembles traditional checking accounts than a fee structure in which no monthly fee 
is charged and cardholders incur fees for varying uses of the card.”).  But see Constantine 
Von Hoffman, Are Prepaid Debit Cards Right for You?, CBS MONEYWATCH (July 22, 
2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-prepaid-debit-cards-right-for-you/ 
(citing an industry report that cards from large financial institutions may be “87 percent less 
expensive” than cards from small entities). 
 69.  Ann Carrns, Prepaid Debit Cards Shed Some Fees, but Face Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/your-money/prepaid-debit-cards-shed-
some-fees-but-face-scrutiny.html?_r=0. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, The Need for Improved Disclosures for General 
Purpose Reloadable Prepaid Cards 3 (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2014/PrepaidCardsDisclosureIssueBriefpdf.pdf. 
 73.  See Bank Secrecy Act Regulations-Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to 
Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403 (proposed July 29, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pts. 1010 and 1022) (updating FinCEN’s 1999 stored value rules to provide a comprehen-
sive approach to regulate “providers” and “sellers,” two types of Money Services Business-
es (MSBs), of prepaid programs); FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, OUTREACH TO THE 
PREPAID ACCESS INDUSTRY (2012) [hereinafter FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
OUTREACH], http://www.fincen.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Outreach_to_the_Prepaid_Industry2_ 
508.pdf (summarizing discussions during town hall meetings in 2012 to reviewing industry 
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Comptroller of Currency74 and state escheat laws.75  Prepaid program 
participants also seek to avoid enforcement actions by the FTC (or the 
CFPB) for an unfair or deceptive trade practice.76 
In contrast, the GPR prepaid card is largely exempt from regulatory 
oversight.  Certain prepaid products are subject to the Durbin Amendment 
of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act of 2010.77  
Likewise, while specific categories of prepaid products are governed by the 
provisions in Regulation E governing disclosures, billing error disputes, 
 
concerns about the implementation of the 2011 Rule); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. 
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FINCEN RULING FIN-2012-R003 (2012), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2012-R003.pdf (providing guidance 
on the application of money service business regulations on a non-bank prepaid card pro-
gram participants when a bank is the named “provider” of the prepaid program in an agree-
ment between the bank and the non-bank).  FinCEN’s rules do not apply to closed loop 
cards for less than $2000, programs funded with only government benefits, cards for access 
to IRS defined “flexible spending accounts” or “health reimbursement accounts,” and pay-
roll cards and open loop cards with a maximum of $1000 per day, provided the card pro-
gram does not allow international transfers, person to person transfers, or loads from non-
depository sources. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, OUTREACH, supra, at 2.  Provid-
ers and sellers are required to (1) develop an AML program; (2) report suspicious activity 
(3) collect and verify consumer information (e.g. name, address, identification number, date 
of birth), (4) maintain transactional records and providers must register as an MSB (sellers 
are not required to register).  Id. at 4, 6-7. Similarly, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC), within the U.S. Department of Treasury, sanctions those that engage in activities 
with countries, groups or individuals listed on the Specifically Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons (SDN) List, such as terrorists, narcotics traffickers and those engaged in 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See generally Specially Designated Na-
tionals List (SDN), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Apr. 28, 2015). 
 74.  See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
OCC BULL. 2011-27, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE AND SOUND PRACTICES (2011), availa-
ble at http:/www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2011/bulletin-2011-27.html (recog-
nizing that prepaid products are “increasingly” marketed to consumers “as an alternative or 
supplement to traditional bank accounts” and advising banks to create an effective prepaid 
access program taking steps to “identify, measure, monitor and control” risks associated 
with the prepaid product and draft written policies and procedures for the program, includ-
ing a procedure oversight of any third party service providers). 
 75.  All fifty states have abandoned property laws that require funds underlying gift 
cards, gift certificates, and prepaid cards be returned to the state after three to five years.  
See generally Teagan J. Gregory, Note, Unclaimed Property and Due Process: Justifying 
“Revenue-Raising” Modern Escheat, 110 MICH. L. REV. 319, 344-45 (2011) (arguing that 
recognizing aggressive state escheat statutes can provide comfort to owners and the public 
at large, provide certainty, and encourage trust in the legislative process). 
 76. DAVID VLADECK ET. AL, FTC STAFF COMMENT TO THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU CONCERNING ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (REGULATION E) AND 
GENERAL PURPOSE RELOADABLE PREPAID CARDS (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2012/07/ftc-staff-comment-
consumer-financial-protection. 
 77.  See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
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consumer liability for unauthorized transaction and rights to statement 
information for electronic payments, the Regulation E does not apply to 
GPR prepaid cards.  Moreover, no federal statute requires that a GPR 
prepaid product be structured in a manner that ensures “pass through” 
deposit insurance.  Over the past few months, some card issuers took steps 
to offer consumer protections for the prepaid product.  For example, VISA 
recently announced a program.78  Likewise, Green Dot, a major prepaid 
cards issuer, is also very vocal about its commitment to consumer 
protection.79  The Center for Financial Services Innovation (“CFSI”) issued 
a “Compass Guide to Prepaid” in an effort to define best practices for the 
prepaid industry.80  The guide identifies four principles—Embrace 
Inclusion, Build Trust, Promote Success, and Create Opportunity—and 
outlines three levels of practices that help to fulfill each of the four 
principles.81 
However, reliance on the industry to provide deposit insurance or 
any other type of consumer protection provision will not ensure that the 
protections are offered industry-wide.82  There may always be industry 
participants that lag behind others in the industry and disparities may arise 
in the market that would severely impact some households.  Because new 
non-bank entities may enter this market (e.g., Apple, Facebook and others) 
clear regulations are needed.  Reserving regulatory action until a crisis 
arises is unacceptable.  Instead, regulatory action ensuring uniformity 
across products will benefit all participants—issuers and consumers.83  
 
 78.  Visa Elevates Prepaid Cards to New Level of Simplicity, Protections and Oppor-
tunity, VISA (June 3, 2014), http://investor.visa.com/news/news-details/2014/Visa-Elevates-
Prepaid-Cards-to-New-Level-of-Simplicity-Protections-and-Opportunity/default.aspx. 
 79.  Green Dot Supports Visa’s New Prepaid Card Designation, GREEN DOT CORP. 
(June 6, 2014), http://ir.greendot.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=235286&p=irol-newsArticle&ID= 
1937968&highlight= (expressing its commitment to efforts to improve consumer protec-
tions). 
 80.  Beth Brockland & Romy Parzick, Compass Guide to Prepaid, CENTER FOR FIN. 
SERVICES INNOVATION (June 24, 2012), http://www.cfsinnovation.com/content/compass-
guide-prepaid. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  A survey by The Pew Charitable Trusts indicates that “almost all” GPR prepaid 
cards have FDIC insurance.  PEW, CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD UP, supra note 14, at 37.  
Zywicki observed that because only one major issuer did not offer deposit insurance, regula-
tion was unnecessary.  Cf. Zywicki, supra note 18, at 1518.  At the time Zywicki’s article 
was published, American Express, a non-bank entity, did not offer deposit insurance, but 
subsequently added the feature to its prepaid product.  Cf. Danielle Douglas, Wal-Mart and 
American Express Prepaid Card gets FDIC Insurance, WASH. POST., Mar. 26, 2013, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/wal-mart-and-amex-prepaid-
card-gets-fdic-insurance/2013/03/26/521fa0aa-9560-11e2-ae32-9ef60436f5c1_story.html. 
 83.  See generally Ari M. Cohen, Note, Protecting the Underserved: Extending the 
Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regulation E to Prepaid Debit Cards, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 215, 240 (2010) (detailing how federal laws and regulations must be extend-
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Moreover, Congress’s directives to provide consumer protection are not 
satisfied by acquiescence to industry practices.  Instead, regulatory action 
must be taken to set a clear standard in the industry, and accordingly, close 
any regulatory gaps.84 
A. Outlining the Regulatory Gap: Deposit Insurance 
 Section 8 of The Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and, with it, insurance for all deposits placed in 
insured banks.  For 107 years leading up to this historical step in 1933, 
efforts to create a state system of deposit insurance had failed.85  Although 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially opposed the legislation, he signed 
 
ed to protect the underserved and the nation’s most vulnerable consumers in light of the in-
creasing popularity of prepaid debit cards). 
 84.  The United States is not alone in its attempts to determine the proper regulatory 
scheme for GPR prepaid cards.  Canada issued regulations covering prepaid cards in early 
2014. Prepaid cards: Your rights and responsibilities, FIN. CONSUMER AGENCY OF CANADA 
http://www.fcac-acfc.gc.ca/Eng/forConsumers/topics/yourRights/Pages/prepaid-
prepayes.aspx (last updated Apr. 29, 2014).  Canada takes a broad approach in its regulation 
by defining prepaid as including products, “[w]hether physical or electronic, that are—or 
can be—loaded with funds that can be used by the cardholder to make withdrawals or pur-
chase goods or services.”  While moving to issue regulations for some consumer protec-
tions, Canada committed to study the need for deposit insurance for the product. Prepaid 
Cards: 10 Things to Consider, FIN. CONSUMER AGENCY OF CANADA, http://www.fcac-
acfc.gc.ca/Eng/resources/publications/paymentOptions/Documents/PrepaidC-Lescarte.pdf 
(last updated May 6, 2014); see also Ben Fung et. al., Electronic Money and Payments: Re-
cent Developments and Issues (Bank of Canada, Discussion Paper No. 2014-2, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.banqueducanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/dp2014-2.pdf (discuss-
ing the need for insurance to ensure safety and efficiency); Tanai Khiaonarong, Oversight 
Issues in Mobile Payments (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/123, 2014), 
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14123.pdf (summarizing de-
velopments in Kenya, Norway, Hong Kong, the European Union, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom on a variety of issues including the provision of deposit insurance for new 
payment products).  According to the website for the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme, which is the deposit insurance authority in the United Kingdom, prepaid cards are 
not covered by deposit insurance. Q&As about the UK Deposit Protection Scheme, FIN. 
SERVICES COMP. SCHEME, http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/questions-and-answers/ 
qas-about-deposits/#Are_pre_paid_cards_covered_by_the_FSCS (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015).  The cards are considered e-money in the United Kingdom and thus governed by the 
EU’s Payment Services Directive, which went into effect on May 1, 2014.   
 85.  See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1998), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf 
(listing all the state attempts between 1829 and 1886 to establish a system of deposit insur-
ance and noting the 150 proposals introduced to Congress for a federal deposit insurance 
system between 1886 and 1933); see also Roger Lowenstein, There’s a Reason for Deposit 
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at BU3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/business/deposit-insurance-and-the-historical-reasons-
for-it.html (providing similar historical context).   
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it on June 12, 1933, three months after declaring a bank holiday.  
Representative Steagall led the effort to enact deposit insurance, and his 
efforts advanced the strong public sentiment supporting the concept.86  At 
the time, deposit insurance symbolized a commitment to protect 
Americans’ hard-earned savings87 and a way to stabilize the monetary 
system.88 
Concern for the everyday depositor was also one of the seven basic 
principles of deposit insurance identified in 2001.  Reviewing the deposit 
insurance system, Alan Binder and Robert F. Wescott listed as Principle 
Six:  “Deposit insurance should relieve small depositors of the burden of 
monitoring banks.”89  This sixth principle remains important in today’s 
economy.  For the past eighty years, bank customers have placed funds in 
their checking accounts with the confidence that the government 
guaranteed the safety of those funds.  With the arrival of a new financial 
product, expansion of deposit insurance is necessary to maintain the 
historical principles underlying deposit insurance.90 
In 2008, the FDIC issued an opinion declaring that deposit 
insurance was available to stored value cards that met certain criteria.91  
 
 86.  See generally Understanding Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/ (last updated Jun. 3, 2014).  Federal deposit insur-
ance coverage has grown from the “temporary” coverage amount of $2,500, stated in origi-
nal legislation, to $250,000, established with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2010)). 
 87.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 435 (1986) (observ-
ing that deposit insurance was intended to protect “the assets and ‘hard earnings’ that busi-
nesses and individuals have entrusted to banks”).  The case provided guidance on the pur-
pose of deposit insurance, but refused to extend the concept of “deposit” to include a 
standby letter of credit. 
 88.  Christine M. Bradley, A Historical Perspective on Deposit Insurance Coverage, 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. BANKING REV., 2000, at 5 (quoting Senator Robert Owen’s 1932 
statement before the House Committee on Banking and Commerce that deposit insurance 
was designed for two reasons:  “[t]o provide the people of the United States with an abso-
lutely safe place and a convenient place to put their savings and their deposits [are] essential 
to the stability of banking, bank deposits and loans, the checks which function as money and 
business conditions in every line”). 
 89.  ALAN S. BLINDER & ROBERT F. WESTCOTT, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REFORM OF 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A REPORT TO THE FDIC (2001), http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance 
/initiative/reform.html 
 90.  The United States scheme for deposit insurance has been criticized and debated by 
academics.  However, as one scholar observed, “[e]ach of these concerns may be valid to 
some extent, yet the public appears to remain convinced that a deposit insurance program is 
worth the costs, which ultimately is borne by them.”  A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 85, at 7. 
 91.  Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Ac-
cess Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67155 (Nov. 13, 2008).  This opinion replaced an older rul-
ing, General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40490 (Aug. 2, 
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Specifically, the General Counsel’s opinion declared that funds placed with 
an insured depository institution are “deposits”92 and are eligible for “pass-
through” insurance coverage if: (1) the deposit account records discloses 
the existence of a custodial relationship, (2) either the records maintained at 
the depository institution or by the custodian disclose the identity of the 
“actual owners of the funds and the amount owned by each such owner,” 
and (3) the funds in the account must be owned by the identified owners 
and not by the custodian.93  Two years later, at a conference addressing the 
new prepaid card industry, Christopher Hencke of the FDIC explained, “the 
goal was to treat underlying prepaid deposits like other deposits that are 
eligible for pass-through coverage.”94 
The United States Treasury recognized the importance of deposit 
insurance in 2010 when it issued regulations permitting electronic federal 
payments to be loaded onto prepaid cards.95  The rule requires that the 
 
1996).  Because the earlier ruling did not view the funds underlying the stored value cards 
as “deposits,” the holders of the cards could not receive deposit insurance if the bank hold-
ing their funds failed during the 2008 crisis.  The crisis prompted consumer advocates to 
seek clarification from the FDIC about deposit insurance coverage.  Sarah Jane Hughes, 
Federal Payroll, Gift, and Prepaid Card Developments: FDIC Deposit Insurance Eligibility 
and the Credit CARD Act of 2009, 65 BUS. LAW. 261 (2009); Paul T. Clark, Just Passing 
Through: A History and Critical Analysis of FDIC Insurance of Deposits Held by Brokers 
and Other Custodians, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. LAW 99 (2012). 
 92.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines “deposit” as– 
[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank  . . . 
in the usual course of business and for which it has given or is obligated to give 
credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, sav-
ings . . . account . . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2011) (emphasis added).  Thus, deposit insurance is available only 
when the funds are maintained in an insured depository bank. 
 93.  See John Douglas et. al., New General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8: The FDIC Pro-
vides Clarity on Deposit Insurance and Assessments on Funds Underlying Stored Valued 
Cards, 126 BANKING L.J. 234 (2009) (explaining the 2008 General Counsel’s opinion). 
 94.  PHILIP KEITEL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE 
PREPAID CARD INDUSTRY: COSTS, BENEFITS AND CHANGING INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 7–8 
(2011), available at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments 
/payment-cards-center/events/conferences/2011/C2011-Federal-Regulation-of-Prepaid-
Card-Industry.pdf. 
 95.  Section 210.5(b) provides:  
(5)(i) Where a Federal payment is to be deposited to an account accessed by the 
recipient through a prepaid card that meets the following requirements: 
(A)The account is held at an insured financial institution;  
(B) The account is set up to meet the requirements for pass-through deposit or 
share insurance such that the funds accessible through the card are insured for 
the benefit of the recipient by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the 
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund in accordance with applicable 
law (12 CFR part 330 or 12 CFR part 745); 
 (C) The account is not attached to a line of credit or loan agreement under 
which re payment from the account is triggered upon delivery of the Federal 
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funds underlying the prepaid card be placed in an insured depository 
institution in an account eligible for “pass-through” insurance for the 
cardholder.96  The rule also prohibits the extension of any loan or line of 
credit that would be paid from an account upon the delivery of additional 
benefits and the issuer must comply with Regulation E’s requirements for 
payroll accounts.  Studies indicate that the federal government is the largest 
source of repeat funding for GPR prepaid cards.97  Thus, with the adoption 
of this rule, GPR prepaid card issuers had to evaluate their programs to 
ensure compliance with the rule’s requirements and eligibility to receive 
disbursements from Treasury. 
Since 2011, some states have established similar rules for card 
programs that receive state benefits.98  In each instance, deposit insurance is 
one of the features required by state governments when it authorizes the 
funding of a GPR prepaid card.  While deposit insurance protection is 
mandatory for prepaid cards loaded with government benefits, this basic 
consumer protection is not available for all GPR prepaid cards. 
 
payments; and 
(D) The issuer of the card complies with all of the requirements, and provides 
the holder of the card with all of the consumer protections, that apply to a pay-
roll card account under the rules implementing the Electronic Fund Transfers 
Act, as amended.  
(ii) No person or entity may issue a prepaid card that receives Federal payments 
in violation of this subsection, and no financial institution may maintain an ac-
count for or on behalf of an issuer of a prepaid card that receives Federal pay-
ments if the issuer violates this paragraph. 
31 C.F.R. § 210.5 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See generally BOARD OF GOVERNORS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 13, at 5 
(reporting that $142 billion (or 13.5%) of the reported $1.054 trillion in disbursements were 
made to prepaid cards); see also Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox W. 
Peterson, Developments in the Law Concerning Stored Value and Other Prepaid Payment 
Products, 62 BUS. LAWYER 229 (2006) (examining the increasing prevalence and regulation 
of prepaid payment products). 
 98.  See, for example, California’s recent enactment of A.B. 1280 that provides protec-
tions for unemployment benefits that are deposited directly to a CalWorks or prepaid card 
obtained on the private market.  A.B. 1280, 2013-14 Sess. (Ca. 2013) (codified at CAL. 
UNEMP. INS. § 1339.1 (West 2014)).  The law ensures that “cash grants on these cards are 
subject to federal protections in order to assist low-income consumers and help keep their 
benefits safe.” Press Release, CA Legal Advocates, California Protects Benefits Deposited 
to Prepaid Cards (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://www.calegaladvocates.org/news 
/article.503017-California_Protects_Benefits_Deposited_to_Prepaid_Cards.  This protection 
afforded to benefits loaded on a prepaid card is similar to the steps taken to prevent bank 
fees against social security payments paid into a bank account.   
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B. Outlining the Gaps in Regulation E’s Consumer Protections 
 Like deposit insurance protection, the consumer protections found 
in Regulation E have been extended to a limited number of prepaid 
products in a piecemeal fashion over a period of years.  Beginning in 2006 
with the Federal Reserve’s amendments to Regulation E to incorporate 
payroll cards,99 and again in 2010, with Congressional action extending 
Regulation E protections to certain gift cards and gift certificates with the 
CARD Act,100 federal lawmakers have been incredibly slow to establish 
consumer protections for new consumer financial products. 
When Regulation E’s protections were extended to payroll cards, 
the Federal Reserve amended the definition of “account” in Section 
205.2(b) to include: 
 
a “payroll card account” which is an account that is directly or 
indirectly established through an employer and to which 
electronic fund transfers of the consumer’s wages, salary, or other 
employee compensation (such as commissions), are made on a 
recurring basis, whether the account is operated or managed by 
the employer, a third-party payroll processor, a depository 
institution or any other person.101 
 
Regulation E’s provisions for payroll cards are limited in scope.  
Specifically, the initial disclosures provisions, a modified method for 
providing account history information, and the error resolution and 
limitation of liability provisions, modified to recognize the electronic 
environment, apply to payroll card accounts.  At the time, the Federal 
Reserve explained that it would not regulate GPR prepaid cards because the 
cards “may only be used for limited purposes or on a short term basis.”102 
Four years later, the Federal Reserve made similar modifications to 
the error resolution, liability limitation and notice provisions in Regulation 
E to accommodate gift cards and gift certificates in accordance with 
congressional directives in the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009.  The CARD Act created a new regulatory 
scheme for credit cards and certain types of prepaid products.  The CARD 
Act imposed disclosure requirements, restrictions on fees and expiration 
dates on general-use prepaid cards (open loop cards), store gift cards 
 
 99.  12 C.F.R. § 205.18 (2013). 
 100.  12 C.F.R. § 205.20 (2012). 
 101.  12 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (2012). 
 102.  Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 30,923, 30,924 (May 12, 
2012). 
ARTICLE 5 (WILSON).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/15  11:51 AM 
950 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:3 
 
(closed loop cards) and store gift certificates.103  Despite all the attention on 
the prepaid market, the regulatory changes did not expressly apply to GPR 
prepaid cards. 
These 2007 and 2010 actions may seem helpful, but were a step 
backwards with respect to regulation of prepaid cards.  In 1996, the Federal 
Reserve Board, then the regulator responsible for the EFTA, issued 
proposed regulations to extend Regulation E to stored value cards.  At the 
time, the market was at its infancy, and ultimately, arguments calling for 
the elimination of legal barriers to innovation prevailed.  However, even at 
that time, the Federal Reserve Board noted the legislative history 
supporting its ability to regulate bank and non-bank entities that offered the 
stored value product and focused its regulation on the product rather than 
the entity issuing the product.104  After wading through the Board’s attempt 
to distinguish “online” and “offline,” and “accountable” and “non-
accountable” systems, the Board concluded that fully on-line, accountable 
systems—parents of today’s GPR prepaid cards—would be subject to all 
requirements of Regulation E.105 The Board was willing to exempt any 
stored valued cards with a maximum load of $100.106  Turning the clock 
forward eighteen years, it is time for action from the CFPB, which has been 
charged with protecting consumers and regulating their interactions with 
electronic-based financial products. 
C. Initial Steps to Close the Regulatory Gap 
The CFPB’s release in 2012 of an ANPR for prepaid cards must be 
viewed as an attempt to provide uniformity and clarity for the consumer 
financial product.  The ANPR sought insights on four categories of 
information: 
 
(A) Regulatory coverage of products by some or all of Regulation 
E, 
(B) Product fees and disclosures, 
(C) Product features, and 
 
 103.  15 U.S.C. § 1693L-1(b)-(c) (2014).  For a summary of the success of the final 
CARD Act rules, see JOSHUA M. FRANK, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CREDIT CARD 
CLARITY: CARD ACT REFORM WORKS (2011) (concluding that the Act did not cause prices 
to increase or access to credit to fall).   
 104.  Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Elec-
tronic Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671, 704 & n.224 (1997). 
   105.    Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696, 19,699-703 (May 2, 1996) 
 106.  Id., at 19,703.  The Board did not proceed with the proposed rules after a six-month 
moratorium on further action was imposed by the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paper-
work Reduction Act of 1996. 
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(D) Other information on GPR cards. 
 
The CFPB also asked for details about the application of Regulation E to 
the prepaid card.107  The CFPB also asked a specific question about the 
appropriateness of deposit insurance although the question seemed to focus 
only on the need for a disclosure about deposit insurance.108  The CFPB 
also included a number of other questions related to the specific questions 
about product features, including whether the cards should offer credit 
features, savings features, or the ability to build credit.109 
 
 107.  The ANPR sought information on Regulation E’s application, stating: 
How should the CFPB define GPR cards in the context of Regulation E?  
Should certain prepaid products not be included in this definition, such as cards 
that may serve a limited purpose (e.g., university cards or health spending 
cards)?  Why or Why not? 
Should only certain aspects of Regulation E be applied to GPR cards? . . .  If the 
Bureau were to propose modifications to the Regulation E protections, what al-
ternative protections or requirements, if any, should the Bureau propose? 
Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 20,923, 20,925 (proposed May 24, 
2012). 
 108.  With respect to deposit insurance, the ANPR asks: 
5. Many, but not all, GPR card accounts are insured by Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) pass-through insurance (coverage that “passes 
through” the agent to the holders of the accounts).  Other GPR cards may pro-
vide alternative security mechanisms, but do not offer FDIC pass-through insur-
ance.  Should the existence, or lack thereof, of FDIC pass-through insurance as-
sociated with a GPR card be disclosed to the consumer?  If so, how and when 
should the existence of FDIC pass-through insurance be disclosed?  
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 109.  Specifically, the ANPR asked, in part: 
6. Currently most GPR cards do not offer credit features, such, such as an 
“overdraft” feature that may be linked to a traditional checking account.  While 
an overdraft can occur in unusual circumstances, as when a small-item transac-
tion is submitted for settlement without prior authorization or when a submitted 
transactions exceeds the authorized amount, generally speaking most GPR card-
holders may not be able to withdraw or spend more than the funds loaded on the 
card.  Nonetheless, some GPR card programs do allow cardholders to opt in to 
an overdraft program in which the issuer may authorize overdrafts and charges 
an overdraft transaction fee.  The Bureau seeks public input on the costs, bene-
fits and consumer protection issues related to any credit features that may be of-
fered by GPR cards. 
7. Currently, most GPR cards do not offer a savings account associated with the 
card.  The Bureau seeks public input on the costs, and benefits, and consumer 
protection issues related to savings features offered with GPR cards.   
8. Currently some GPR cards include a feature that claims to offer consumers 
the opportunity to improve or build credit.  Consumers generally need to opt in 
to this feature, which involves the reporting of certain information to credit re-
porting agencies.  The Bureau seeks public input and data concerning the effica-
cy of credit reporting features on GPR cards in enabling consumers to improve 
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A public discourse about the proper features for the GPR prepaid 
cards was prompted by the ANPR.110  A number of consumer advocates 
and industry leaders support the extension of important consumer 
protections to prepaid cards.  Some consumer advocates urge the extension 
of Regulation E’s protections to the GPR prepaid card.111  Others call for 
deposit insurance protection so funds are safeguarded in the event the card 
issuer files for bankruptcy.112  Still others seek changes with respect to 
overdraft features and the use of arbitration to resolve a consumer 
dispute.113  All of these views were presented to Congress and the CFPB 
over a period of several months.  On November 13, 2014, after months of 
anticipation, the CFPB announced its proposed regulations at a Town Hall 
meeting in Wilmington, Delaware.114 
III. REGULATION OF GPR PREPAID CARDS WILL ENSURE 
CONSISTENT PROTECTION FOR CONSUMERS AND PROMOTE FAIR 
COMPETITION 
The growing consensus in the prepaid industry about the 
protections needed for GPR prepaid cards provides a good foundation for 
establishing regulations for the GPR prepaid product.  The CFPB may 
utilize the data and information presented at the 2012 Town Hall meeting 
on Prepaid Cards, the formal comments to its ANPR and information 
 
or build credit.  The Bureau also seeks information on whether regulatory provi-
sions should address how such services are marketed to consumers. 
Id. 
 110.  News reports document consumer experiences with GPR prepaid cards, including 
confusion about fees, errors at ATM machines and difficulties recovering funds after an er-
ror is acknowledged.  Although no reliable information is available to assessing the frequen-
cy of errors, clear rules would assist consumers seeking to correct mistakes. 
 111.  Letter from Karen Harris, Dir., Asset Opportunity Unit, Sargent Shriver Nat’l Ctr. 
on Poverty Law, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Bureau of Consumer Fin. 
Prot. (July 11, 2012) (on file with author); Letter from John W. Ryan, President & CEO, 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Bu-
reau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (July 23, 2012) (on file with author). 
   112.   Letter from Dory Rand, President, Woodstock Inst., to Monica Jackson, Office of 
the Exec. Sec’y, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. (March 23, 2015) (on file with author). 
 113.  See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 25; NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., COMMENTS OF 
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (REGULATION E) 3-
41, 87 (2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/rulemaking/cm-prepaid-card-july2012.pdf 
(discussing overdraft and arbitration).  In California, the NCLC worked with the Western 
Center on Law and Poverty to convince lawmakers about the need for deposit insurance 
when public unemployment benefits are loaded onto prepaid cards. 
 114.  cfpbvideo, Wilmington, DE: Field Hearing on Prepaid Accounts, YOUTUBE (Dec. 
18, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4F-bLzz-pM4. 
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gathered by its Research, Markets and Regulations Division,115 to guide its 
regulations and meet Congress’ directive that the agency ensure that, with 
respect to consumer financial products, “[f]ederal consumer financial law is 
enforced consistently, without regard to the status of a person as a 
depository institution, in order to promote fair competition.”116 
Numerous witnesses at the CFPB’s 2012 Durham, North Carolina, 
Town Hall Meeting highlighted the similarities between the GPR prepaid 
card issued by banks and nonbanks and the traditional checking account 
offered by traditional banks and credit unions.117 Various studies about 
prepaid cards echo this theme by suggesting that millennials, with their 
smartphones, use GPR prepaid cards to pay rent and buy groceries just as 
their parents have used the traditional banking products, checks and debit 
cards, for the same purposes.118  Because of the similarities between a 
checking account, which may be connected with a debit card, and GPR 
prepaid cards, consumers expect that both products will carry certain 
protections.  Consumer expectations, therefore, weigh in favor of ensuring 
that the prepaid product is not second-rate or inferior to an account 
maintained with a depository institution.119 
A. Functionally equivalent consumer financial products should be 
regulated similarly 
Requiring deposit insurance for all GPR prepaid cards will help 
ensure that this popular product effectively protects all users of similarly 
featured financial products.  For a number of years, the OCC, the primary 
regulator for national banks, interpreted its authority to regulate the 
“business of banking” under the National Bank Act by determining, 
initially, whether a new activity was the “functional equivalent or logical 
 
 115.  Goal 3 in the CFPB’s Strategic Plan is to “[i]nform the public, policy-makers, and 
the CFPB’s own policymaking with data-driven analysis of consumer finance markets and 
consumer behavior.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Strategic Plan FY 2013-FY 
2017, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ %20strategic-
plan/#goal3 (last visited May 8, 2015). 
 116.  12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(4) (2011). 
 117.  cfpbvideo, Durham, NC: Field Hearing on Prepaid Cards, YOUTUBE (Jun. 7, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-05GfuhrAc. 
 118.  See Herbst-Murphy & Weed, supra note 38, at 1. 
 119.  See Tom Feltner, Vice-President, Woodstock Inst., Speech at CFPB Prepaid Card 
Field Hearing (May 23, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/120522_cfpb_prepaid_fieldhearing_0.pdf) (noting in response 
to the CFPB’s ANPR, that the GPR is simply a “collection of features already widely avail-
able” and that “[f]rom the consumer perspective, . . . swiping a debit, credit or GPR card 
looks and feels the same regardless of what rules apply.”). 
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outgrowth of a recognized banking function.”120  Over the years, the 
banking industry has asked the courts to recognize new activities and 
products as part of the “business of banking” because they were 
“functionally equivalent” to another banking activity.121  Accordingly, 
because GPR prepaid cards function like traditional checking accounts 
protected by deposit insurance, deposit insurance should be available for 
GPR prepaid cardholders.  Due to the deposit insurance requirement for 
any card receiving funds for government benefits, some non-bank GPR 
program participants have already found a way to participate despite this 
restriction and therefore would not incur any additional costs if this feature 
were required.  Other GPR prepaid issuers will incur costs to bring their 
cards into compliance, but the costs are small when compared to the 
potential loss to consumers in the event a non-bank entity fails.  The 
Network Branded Prepaid Card Association (“NBPCA”), an industry trade 
association, noted the low costs associated with a deposit insurance 
requirement when it observed that the requirements for “pass through” 
deposit insurance could be met “without excessive administrative burden or 
invasion of consumer privacy.”122 
 
 120.  Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the 
Future, 50 BUS. LAW. 783, 785 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in VALIC 
allows banking powers to evolve “over time to keep pace with developments in business 
practices, consumer needs and new technologies.”).   
 121.  See, e.g., Securities Industry Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
716 F.2d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the principal concern is “whether the proposed 
service is functionally related to traditional services banks generally have performed.”); see 
also M&M Leasing Co. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978) (noting that leasing personal property is “functionally in-
terchangeable” to traditional secured lending). 
 122.  A NBPCA Position Paper states: 
The NBPCA supports rules that would require certain reloadable prepaid card 
programs, like payroll cards, to be structured to fulfill FDIC “pass-through” re-
quirements.  Such programs can be made to comply with existing rules without 
excessive administrative burden or invasion of consumer privacy.  However, 
nonreloadable prepaid card programs—with their high-volume, low-value trans-
actions—are not conducive to compliance with the FDIC’s “pass through” re-
quirements.  Moreover, due to heightened consumer vigilance with regard to is-
sues such as identity theft and privacy, it is impractical to collect and 
unreasonable to expect consumers to furnish the information necessary for pro-
vision of FDIC pass-through insurance when purchasing a low-value nonre-
loadable prepaid card.  As such, absent new FDIC rules that would provide spe-
cialized treatment for pooled accounts, the NBPCA believes that deposit 
insurance requirements for non-reloadable prepaid cards would diminish their 
availability and usefulness. 
Prepaid Cards & Deposit Insurance, NETWORK BRANDED PREPAID CARD ASSOCIATION (em-
phasis added), available at http://www.nbpca.com/~/media/F6A8D19D6F414D01844F4A7 
06B8E4586.ashx (last visited May 8, 2015). 
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Most prepaid card issuers structure their programs by pooling the 
funds loaded on the prepaid card into a single account at a federally insured 
depository institution.  If the pooled account is structured in a way that 
ensures FDIC insurance, the consumer has the benefit of FDIC deposit 
insurance.  However, the consumer does not know and cannot assess the 
issuer’s compliance with the FDIC’s guidance.123  Requiring FDIC 
insurance for all participants will eliminate the need for consumers to 
monitor this aspect of a GPR prepaid program. 
B. Consumers cannot properly assess risks 
Deposit insurance is also needed because consumers cannot assess 
risks in a GPR prepaid program by monitoring the behavior of the card 
issuers.124  It is unreasonable––even in the information age––to expect all 
consumers to monitor the behavior of the participants in the GPR prepaid 
industry.  Not only are consumers unaware of the architecture underlying 
the GPR prepaid card, with multiple entities participating in a single 
prepaid program, consumers simply cannot monitor the financial health of 
each participant or understand the domino effect that might arise if one 
participant becomes insolvent or violates one of myriad compliance 
rules.125  A non-bank entity may be incorporated under the laws of one 
state, but subject to money transmitter regulations in two or more states.126  
With information about these entities scattered in various places, a 
requirement of deposit insurance eliminates an otherwise heavy cost of 
monitoring for the consumer. 
Even if the consumer could gather the necessary information to 
evaluate a GPR prepaid program in a timely manner, it is unlikely that the 
average consumer could properly assess all the different types of risks 
 
 123.  The Illinois Attorney General recently filed suit against a small lender alleging that 
the lender is offering a short-term loan designed just like a revolving line of credit (or credit 
card product) in order to evade an interest rate cap on small-dollar or “payday loans.”  The 
complaint outlines the similarities between the loan offered and the restricted product, notes 
that the lender does not offer any of the consumer protections required for small-dollar loans 
issued in the state, and suggests that the products should be treated similarly.  People of Illi-
nois v. CMK Investments, Inc., No. 2014CH04694 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, filed Mar. 18, 
2014). 
 124.  See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.   
 125.  See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
OCC BULL. NO. 2011-27, PREPAID ACCESS PROGRAMS OCC ISSUANCES BULLETINS 2011 
(2011) (providing guidance for national banks on assessing and managing risks associated 
with prepaid card programs, including programs outsourced to third party service provid-
ers.)  The OCC has taken some actions against banks involved in GPR prepaid card pro-
grams for failing to create a proper business plan assessing the risks and available controls 
for the program.  See, e.g., Urban Trust Bank Agreement, supra note 29, at *7-8. 
 126.  Douglas King, supra note 30, at 3. 
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associated with a prepaid card program.127  GPR prepaid cards, like credit 
cards and debit cards, are susceptible to fraud and security breaches.  Early 
reports suggest that wrongdoers are attacking back office platforms to load 
funds onto counterfeit cards or remove daily or weekly spending limits on 
prepaid cards and change available balances on cards.  If the wrongdoer 
can obtain the PIN associated with the card, then cash can be withdrawn 
from an ATM.128  These schemes are difficult to identify and investigate.129  
Cybersecurity is another significant risk that must be managed by all 
organizations in today’s digital environment.130  The annual reports of these 
institutions highlight the risks of insolvency stemming from security 
breaches and fraud schemes.  For example, Target recently reported that it 
incurred significant expenses in connection with a security breach.131  
While new technologies should make payments more secure,132 it is 
impossible to expect the consumer to adequately assess the risks that could 
clearly impact the financial health of an organization. 
In addition to insolvency and fraud risks, compliance penalties 
associated with the anti-money laundering (“AML”) rules promulgated 
under the Bank Secrecy Act could impact the financial health of a prepaid 
issuer.  New AML regulations for prepaid access programs that took effect 
in March 2012 require several participants in a prepaid program to register 
as a Money Service Business (“MSB”) and implement procedures to know 
 
 127.  See Laurence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: 
Lessons from PayPal (May 16, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2314119 (outlining the variety of risks, 
including cybercrime, cyber terrorism, fraud and anti-money laundering that PayPal, an e-
commerce business must disclose and manage).   
   128.  Megan Goldschmidt, Prepaid Cards’ Role in Fraud: Experts Says Cards are Re-
placing Money Mules, BANKINFOSECURITY (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/prepaid-cards-role-in-fraud-a-6693/op-1 (discussing fraud 
schemes involving the takeover of an online bank account, connecting it with a prepaid card, 
and then laundering funds through a combination of the two products). 
 129.  See, e.g., id.  For a full discussion of crimes utilizing prepaid cards, see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-407T, MOVING ILLEGAL PROCEEDS: OPPORTUNITIES 
EXIST FOR STRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO STEM CROSS-BORDER CURRENCY 
SMUGGLING (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125688.pdf. 
 130.  On June 24, 2014, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council launched 
a website designed to highlight the federal government’s resources for cybersecurity.  The 
CFPB and all the traditional banking regulators––the OCC, Fed, FDIC, and NCUA––joined 
with the FFIEC to host the website.  Press Release, Fed. Fin. Inst. Examinations Council, 
FFIEC Launches Cybersecurity Web Page, Promotes Awareness of Cybersecurity Activities 
(June 24, 2014), available at https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr062414.htm. 
 131.  Target Corp., Current Report, Items 2.02 and 9.01 (Form 8-K) (Aug. 5, 2014). 
 132.  Christopher Elliott, U.S. Cards Aren’t Keeping Up, WASH. POST, June 22, 2014, at 
F2 (comparing American credit card security measures with European chip-and-PIN tech-
nology). 
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and verify the identity of their customers.133  Given the numerous players 
involved in a prepaid card program, third-party compliance associated with 
outsourcing is another source of risk.134  While these risks may lead to non-
monetary reputational losses, compliance penalties could impact the entire 
prepaid program.135 
Traditional payment law concepts support the regulation requiring 
deposit insurance for the GPR prepaid product.  For many years, payment 
law in the United States has been based on Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, a law built, in part, on the philosophy that the person 
best able to prevent the loss should bear the loss.136  In the prepaid card 
market, the card issuer can prevent consumer losses due to insolvency by 
simply structuring the program in a way that ensures deposit insurance. 
Finally, the pace of change in the payments industry hinders the 
consumer’s ability to adequately monitor and manage their finances.  As 
Director Cordray explained: 
 
[A]s consumer financial life has become more complex, and thus 
harder for people to manage and control, and as third parties take 
on a larger role in the financial matters of individuals, we need to 
remain vigilant to protect the safety and integrity of these systems 
for consumers . . . .  We all know that consumers do not fully 
understand how these systems work, which leaves them 
vulnerable to abuses.137 
 
Federal regulation of the GPR prepaid card is needed because of the limits 
on a consumer’s ability to monitor the financial industry. 
 
 133.  See King, supra note 30, at 6-7 (outlining the compliance requirements for anti-
money laundering regulations); see also Prepaid Money Card MoneyPak Becomes Vulnera-
ble to Fraud Schemes, THE PAYPERS (August 4, 2014, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.thepaypers.com/e-identity-security-online-fraud/prepaid-money-card-
moneypak-becomes-vulnerable-to-fraud-schemes/756053-26 (discussing the MoneyPak 
fraud schemes). 
 134.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, 
OCC BULL. NO. 2013-29, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (2013), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2013/bulletin-2013-29.html (providing 
guidance to banks for managing risks with third party relationships). 
 135.  See King, supra note 30, at 6-7. 
 136.  See generally Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Patricia B. Fry, A “Systems” Approach to Pay-
ment Modes: Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 UCC L.J. 283, 289, 312–21 (1984) 
(summarizing the loss allocation rules under Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code). 
 137.  Cordray, supra note 9. 
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C. Money Transmitter Laws serve a different purpose 
Many states attempt to provide protections for their residents by 
requiring issuers of GPR prepaid cards to obtain money transmitter 
licenses.138  State money transmitter laws were enacted as a means to 
govern businesses that serve as an intermediary in the transfer of money 
between two parties.  Importantly, the business model is based on accepting 
money for the sole purpose of transmitting it to another person.  The state 
laws were designed to prevent the loss of the consumer’s funds by ensuring 
the safety and soundness of the business.139  Thus, state money transmitter 
laws, aimed at monitoring the industry participants, establish net worth 
requirements, bond requirements, criminal background checks and 
reporting requirements, may also provide for safety and soundness 
examinations.  However, money transmitter laws do not offer a consistent 
level of protection for consumers.140  Under most money transmitter laws, 
the business obtains a license after posting a surety bond.  The amount of 
the bond differs by state and by the size of the business.  Surprisingly, bond 
amounts range from $1000 to $500,000.141  Other varying requirements for 
the license relate to the size and type of investments the business may make 
under state law.142 
 
 138.  See generally THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, IMPERFECT PROTECTION: USING 
MONEY TRANSMITTER LAWS TO INSURE PREPAID CARDS 1-2 (2013) [hereinafter PEW, 
IMPERFECT PROTECTION], http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets 
/2013/Pewprepaidmoneytransmitterpdf.pdf (observing general procedures and trends associ-
ated with state money transmitter laws); see also Judith Rinearson & Kristine M. Andreas-
sen, Developments in the Regulation of Prepaid Payment Products Under State Money 
Transmitter Licensing Laws, 65 BUS. LAW. 271, 274-76 (2009) (detailing the numerous dif-
ferences in the state money transmitter laws with respect to the types of businesses and 
product offerings that might make a nonbank subject to the state law). 
 139.  Tu, supra note 18, at 85-86 (2013); see also Ramasastry, supra note 26, at 819 
(suggesting that state licensing laws fill the gap for error resolution procedures until federal 
regulators evaluate the role of prepaid card issuers and other payment intermediaries in the 
payment industry). 
 140.  See PEW, IMPERFECT PROTECTION, supra note 138, at 2 (displaying how money 
transmitter laws lack certainty and security); see also Tu, supra note 18, at 109-12 (high-
lighting the uncertainty and costs associated with the “patchwork” of state money transmit-
ter regulatory environment and calling for a new solution). 
 141.  PEW, IMPERFECT PROTECTION, supra note 138, at 2.  Three states, Montana, New 
Mexico and South Carolina, do not require a money transmitter license.  Id.  Thus, prepaid 
programs are subject to many different types of money transmitter laws.  For example, 
Green Dot’s 2013 annual report indicates that it has a money transmitter license in “39 
states, Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C.” GREEN DOT CORP., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 9 
(2013), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=235286&p=irol-reportsAnnual. 
 142.  Most litigation under state money transmitter laws involves entities that have failed 
to obtain a money transmitter license.   
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As many have observed, money transmitter laws are not designed 
to protect cardholder funds for two reasons.  First, the state laws impose 
few limits on the investments a card issuer may make with the funds 
received from cardholders.  In contrast, traditional banking regulators 
require banks to hold a certain percentage of funds on reserve and 
investments are strictly limited and reviewed.143  As Sheila Bair, former 
Chairman of the FDIC observed:  “[P]repaid card companies can take 
customers’ money and invest it in any investment-grade securities, which 
may or may not be readily convertible to cash.”144  Second, state money 
transmitter laws require bonds that are issued in amounts inadequate to 
cover the millions of dollars underlying the GPR prepaid cards held by a 
single issuer.  Any consumer seeking to recover under a bond would have 
to engage in a time-consuming claim process.  Upon a determination of 
insolvency, a non-bank entity would file a petition for bankruptcy, causing 
consumers to have to navigate the bankruptcy claim process.  Even if 
priority status were possible, the claims process would take months.  
Clearly, the money transmitter laws, while adequate to monitor the 
participants in the industry, are not designed to serve the needs of those 
who depend on the sums loaded on the GPR prepaid card for everyday 
expenses.  In contrast, up to $250,000 would be available to each prepaid 
cardholder with federal deposit insurance in the event of an issuer’s 
insolvency. 
State money transmitter laws were designed for a different type of 
business.  The law anticipates a business that holds the funds for a short 
period of time and gives the funds to the intended beneficiary.  In contrast, 
the funds underlying the GPR prepaid card are held for indefinite periods 
of time and are directed to recipients who are not identified or anticipated 
at the time the funds are deposited. 
While no GPR prepaid program has suffered a significant loss to 
date, three companies participating in prepaid program filed bankruptcy in 
recent years.  In 2009, the OCC closed Silverton Bank, a national bank in 
Atlanta, GA due to its deteriorating financial condition.  At the time of 
Silverton Bank’s closure, the failed bank did not issue any prepaid cards, 
but it provided a variety of supports for its programs.145  The FDIC 
established a bridge bank to take over the operations of the failed 
institution, so the support services were not interrupted.  Springbok 
Services, Inc., a non-bank program manager for a prepaid card program 
 
 143.  See generally RICHARD S. CARNELL ET. AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 49-50 (4th ed. 2009). 
 144.  Sheila Bair, Be Wary of Prepaid Card Protection, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2013, 7:00 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/04/07/prepaid-cards-shelia-bair-column/ 
2050235/. 
 145.  Keitel, supra note 32, at 4-5. 
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filed bankruptcy in 2010.  Once again, consumers did not suffer significant 
losses because the banks that issued Springbok’s cards agreed to process 
and service all the outstanding cards.146  These cases involved the 
insolvency of a servicing or supporting entity in the prepaid card chain and 
demonstrate that the risk of insolvency is present in the industry.  Without a 
doubt, if other entities in the prepaid card chain are unavailable to mitigate 
loss, consumers could suffer significant losses if only money transmitter 
laws are in place.147  
A more recent case illustrates other types of issues that might arise 
in a GPR prepaid card program.148  The case involves NetSpend, a seller of 
GPR prepaid cards, which contracts with FDIC insured banks to issue its 
cards.  The case involved an insurer’s responsibility to protect NetSpend 
from certain losses in a related matter.  The court ruled that due to 
NetSpend’s failure to report a claim in a timely manner, the insurer was not 
required to defend NetSpend in the other litigation.149  Thus, a contractual 
attempt to prevent a loss was negated due to actions taken by entities within 
the prepaid program.  This is just one example of a situation where one 
entity in a prepaid card program was unable to use private insurance to 
manage a risk.  If deposit insurance is not required, the funds underlying a 
prepaid card are at risk if a prepaid card program suffers a loss not covered 
by private insurance.  Once again, no consumer suffered a loss, but 
together, the three cases, highlight the close relationship between all 
entities in the prepaid chain.  There is real risk of insolvency or loss with a 
GPR prepaid card program and the possibility that contractual 
arrangements and state money transmitter laws could be inadequate to 
protect all customers in a particular program is present.  Deposit insurance 
would protect consumers from these risks. 
Clearly, consumer confidence in these changing times would be 
advanced by requiring that funds underlying general reloadable prepaid 
cards are protected by deposit insurance.  With the payments industry 
undergoing significant change, steps must be taken to ensure the continued 
protection of consumer funds in transaction accounts. 
IV. THE CFPB’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE GPR PREPAID CARDS 
Three statutes provide the basis for the CFPB’s regulatory 
authority over the GPR prepaid card industry and accordingly, its ability to 
 
 146.  Id. at 5-6. 
 147.  Id. at 6-7.  The Keitel report also references comments by Terrence Maher, general 
counsel to the Network Branded Prepaid Card Association (NCPCA). Id. at 6-11. 
 148.  NetSpend Corp. v. Axis Ins. Co., No. A-13-CA-456-SS, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Tex. 
July 18, 2014). 
 149.  Id. at 8. 
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ensure the protection of consumer funds placed in a GPR prepaid program.  
First, the EFTA’s definition of “account” includes the GPR prepaid card, so 
the CFPB has the power to adapt Regulation E’s consumer protections for 
the prepaid cards.  Second, Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to ensure that 
consumer financial products are regulated consistently without regard to 
the issuer of the product.  Thus, Dodd-Frank provides authority for the 
CFPB to require deposit insurance for GPR prepaid cards and support for 
the extension of Regulation E protections to GPR prepaid cards.  Finally, 
the CFPB may use its power under the Dodd-Frank Act to declare the 
issuance of a GPR prepaid card without important consumer protections as 
an unfair, deceptive or abusive practice and take enforcement actions 
against industry actors who issue prepaid cards without necessary 
consumer protections.  If the CFPB determines for some reason that 
statutory authority to provide any particular consumer protection feature is 
unclear, Congress should act swiftly to extend important consumer 
protections for the GPR prepaid card. 
A. Extending Regulation E protections 
Section 904 of the EFTA provides: 
 
 (d) APPLICABILITY TO SERVICE PROVIDERS OTHER 
THAN CERTAIN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If electronic fund transfer services are 
made available to consumers by a person other than a 
financial institution holding a consumer’s account, the 
[CFPB] shall by regulation assure that the disclosures, 
protections, responsibilities, and remedies created by this 
subchapter are made applicable to such persons and 
services.150 
 
 
 150.  Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d) (2012) (emphasis added).  Pro-
fessor Mark Budnitz outlined a legal framework for regulating “stored value cards” almost 
seventeen years ago in an article explaining the various designs for a consumer product very 
similar to today’s GPR prepaid card.  See Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the 
Consumer: The Need for Regulation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1038-39 (1997) (outlining the 
legislative history illustrating Congressional intent that the Federal Reserve, then the sole 
administrative agency charged with implementing the Act, had broad powers to regulate 
electronic-based consumer financial products); see also id. at 1039 (“Most significantly for 
consumers, the Senate Banking Committee stated that the EFTA defined ‘financial institu-
tion’ and ‘account’ broadly ‘so as to assure that all persons who offer equivalent EFT ser-
vices involving any type of asset account are subject to the same standards and consumers 
owning such accounts are assured of uniform protection.”).  
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Under this section, the CFPB has clear authority to regulate prepaid cards 
issued by both insured depository institutions and non-bank entities.  
Congress anticipated that technology would bring changes to the consumer 
financial product industry, so the EFTA’s language assures that the relevant 
federal agency has the authority to adapt to the changing marketplace.151  
Thus, the CFPB may regulate electronic transfer services offered to 
consumers by banks and nonbanks alike. 
Section 903(2) defines an account as  “a demand deposit, savings 
deposit, or other asset account . . . established primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.”152  This statutory definition is broad 
enough to encompass the GPR prepaid card issued by banks and non-
banks.  In short, when a consumer loads a GPR prepaid card, she is creating 
an asset account under the EFTA. Therefore, the definition of “account” in 
the EFTA or Regulation E does not need to be amended. 153 
 
 151.  See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1977), available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00830509f;view=1up;seq=3; see also Peter 
D. Schellie, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 34 BUS. LAW. 1441, 1443-44 (1979) (explaining 
how the Act will be subject to “continuous refinement and reinterpretation” because Con-
gress defined terms more broadly than their common usage). 
 152.  Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 903(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (2012). 
 153.  Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), along with co-sponsor Sen. Richard Blumenthal 
(D-Conn.), introduced the “Prepaid Card Consumer Protection Act of 2013.”  S. 1867, 113th 
Cong. (2013).  This Act is similar to legislation introduced in 2009, 2010, and 2011.  The 
proposed legislation extends Regulation E to prepaid cards by amending the definition of 
“account” to include a “spending account,” which is defined as: 
[A] deposit account— 
(A) (i) that is established by a consumer or on behalf of a consumer at an in-
sured depository institution or an insured credit union; (ii) that contains the 
funds of a consumer; (iii) to which payments are to be made by a consumer, or 
at the direction of a consumer; (iv) to which recurring electronic fund transfers 
may be made, at the direction of a consumer; or (v) from which payments may 
be made at the direction of a consumer through the use of a card, code, or de-
vice; 
(B) includes a deposit account described in subparagraph (A)— (i) that is oper-
ated or managed by a financial institution, or any other person; and (ii) the funds 
of which are (I) pooled with funds of a person other than the person who estab-
lished the account; or (II) held in a name other than that of the person who es-
tablished the account . . . . 
Proposed S. 1867.  Using a similar approach, on January 9, 2014, Sen. Mark Warner (D-
Va.) introduced the “Prepaid Card Disclosure Act of 2014,” which requires fuller disclo-
sures for prepaid cards.  S. 1903, 113th Cong. (2014).  Although narrower in scope, the leg-
islation expands the application of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act by adding an identical-
ly defined “spending account” term describing a prepaid card. Thus, both bills take the same 
approach – amending the definition of “account” as a mechanism to extend regulatory au-
thority.  Arguably, however, this approach is unnecessary. 
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However, the CFPB elected to clarify the meaning of “account” 
with its proposed regulation by creating a new subsection to define a 
“prepaid account.”  Specifically, the CFPB proposed to add § 1005.2(b)(3), 
which defines a prepaid account as “a card, code, or other device, that is 
not otherwise an account under § 1005.2(b)(1), that is established primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes, and that satisfies three 
additional criteria as laid out in proposed § 1005.2(b)(3)(i)(A) through 
(C) . . . .”154 
In addition to clarifying the expanded scope of the EFTA, the 
CFPB’s proposed rule also adapts Regulation E’s protections for notices, 
including fee disclosures and statement information.  Error resolution 
procedures and liability limitation provisions could be adopted for the GPR 
prepaid product.155 
1. Disclosures 
Several provisions in Regulation E require disclosures to 
cardholders.  Section 205.7 requires a number of disclosures at the time the 
consumer “contracts for an electronic fund transfer service.”156  The list of 
disclosures includes information about the consumer’s liability for 
unauthorized electronic fund transfers, limits on transfers, fees, rights to 
receipts and periodic statements, and error resolution procedures.157  Even 
before the issuance of the proposed rules in November 2014, the CFPB had 
taken significant steps to create clear disclosures for consumers.158  The 
proposed rule requires a disclosure that is very similar to the disclosure box 
developed by the Pew Charitable Trusts.159  This disclosure box has proven 
to be very effective with consumers and represents a marked improvement 
for marketplace.160 
 
 154. Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the 
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 79 Fed. Reg. 77,102, 77,128__ (Dec. 23, 2014) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 1005 and 1026). 
 155.  VLADECK, supra note 76, at 4 n.35 (suggesting that because payroll cards are the 
type of payment card most similar to GPR prepaid card accounts, it may be appropriate to 
use the payroll card model for applying Regulation E to GPR prepaid accounts).  
 156.  12 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2006). 
 157.  12 C.F.R. § 205.7(b)(1)-(10) (2006). 
 158.  See Goldberg, supra note 12. 
 159.  The Need for Improved Disclosures for General Purpose Reloadable Prepaid 
Cards, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en 
/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2014/02/26/the-need-for-improved-disclosures-for-
general-purpose-reloadable-prepaid-cards. 
 160.  Id. 
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2. Transaction Statements 
Similarly, Regulation E’s current requirements for account history 
were adapted to the prepaid product under the CFPB’s proposed rule.  
Under the rule, transaction data must be made available electronically or 
via a phone call without cost to the cardholder.161 
3. Error Resolution Procedures 
Currently, consumers using debit cards and credit cards have error 
resolution rights that may not be available to users of GPR prepaid cards.  
Both the EFTA and Regulation E, for debit cards, and the TILA and 
Regulation Z, for credit cards, require the issuing financial institution to 
promptly investigate any error and to recredit the consumer account within 
a specific period of time.  Under the CFPB’s proposed rule, the error 
resolution procedure for GPR prepaid cards closely follows the procedures 
for debit cards, and therefore, should not surprise industry participants.162 
4. Liability Limitation Provisions 
The proposed rules also extend Regulation E’s loss limitations to 
the prepaid product.  Most cardholders of GPR prepaid cards expect to be 
protected against loss in the event of theft or unauthorized use of the card.  
Some might argue that a cardholder carrying a card funded with his own 
funds should exercise care to prevent loss or unauthorized use.  However, 
not only do consumers generally not understand how cards are protected 
against loss, but oftentimes, a loss may occur despite the cardholder’s 
 
 161.  Consumers often consult their checking account history to confirm payments or to 
prepare income tax returns.  Thus, the sixty day transaction history required by § 205.18 for 
payroll card accounts is not sufficient for GPR prepaid cards.  One commentator to the 
ANPR suggested that the period for electronic history should be extended for one year.  See 
Comments of Nat’l Law Ctr., Ctr. for Responsible Lending and Consumer Fed’n of Am., 
July 23, 2012 at 68 (on file with author).  This longer period may be sufficient if it is com-
bined with the ability to obtain a written history of the consumer’s transaction for a slightly 
longer period of eighteen months.  This modification for GPR prepaid cards attempts to rec-
ognize the minor differences between the GPR prepaid card and a payroll card account. 
 162.  Under Regulation E, a consumer reporting an error must provide certain types of 
information to the financial institution.  Thereafter, the financial institution has ten business 
days to investigate and determine whether an error occurred.  If the financial institution 
needs additional time to investigate, it must re-credit the missing funds upon the expiration 
of a ten-day period.  Upon providing the provisional credit, a financial institution may take 
up to forty-five calendar days from the receipt of the original notice to complete the investi-
gation.  If the investigation confirms the error, the financial institution has one business day 
after determining that an error occurred to correct it.   
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careful practices.  Accordingly, like the TILA provisions,163 GPR prepaid 
cardholders should be limited to a loss of $50 for theft or unauthorized use 
of the card.  Adoption of the more protective credit card limit for GPR 
prepaid cards is appropriate because it would avoid the confusion that 
existed before contractual provisions instituted $0 liability provisions into 
debit card contracts in the late 1990s.164 
Overall, Regulation E protections are properly extended to the 
prepaid product under the Proposed Rule.  Nevertheless, the Proposed 
Rules are inadequate in that they fail to ensure that deposit insurance will 
be available to holders of GPR prepaid cards.  Because the EFTA does not 
address the provision of federal deposit insurance, the CFPB must use its 
powers under Dodd-Frank to compel GPR prepaid card issuers to provide 
deposit insurance for consumers.165 
 
 163.  15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2013). 
 164.  David J. Morrow, Handy?  Surely, But Debit Card Has Risks, Too: Popular Bank 
Feature Has Hidden Expenses, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997, at 1, 9 (describing the experienc-
es of consumers, at a time when debit cards were a new innovation, as consumers came to 
realize that the unlimited liability provisions in the debit card law were different from the 
$50 limitation in the credit card law). 
 165.  A number of questions in the ANPR request information about the appropriateness 
of several other features for a prepaid card.  The questions mention arbitration terms, credit 
features, and overdraft fees.  Separately, the CFPB is assessing arbitration practices with 
regard to these features on consumer financial products, so this study will undoubtedly in-
fluence the Bureau’s evaluation of these features for the GPR prepaid card.  CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:  REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM & CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028 (2015).  While a full evalua-
tion of all the features mentioned in the ANPR is beyond the scope of this paper, one recent 
study concerning overdraft fees on checking accounts is directly related to the GPR prepaid 
cards that serve as a substitute for a checking account.  Effective in 2010, § 205.17 of Regu-
lation E provides that checking account customers must affirmatively opt-in to overdraft 
coverage for ATM withdrawals and debit card point-of-sale transactions.  A recent CFPB 
report details the overdraft fees paid by bank customers “opting in” to overdraft protection 
for debit card and ATM transactions and concludes that the majority of overdraft fees are 
incurred on overdrafts of $24 or less. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: 
CHECKING ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT 5 (2014), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_report_ data-point_overdrafts.pdf; see also 
Press Release, Consumer Prot. Fin. Bureau, CFPB Finds Small Debit Purchases Lead to Ex-
pensive Overdraft Charges (July 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cpfb-finds-small-debit-purchases-lead-to-
expensive-overdraft-charges/.. While it is too soon to anticipate the steps the CFPB will take 
to address this finding, the report should support a determination that overdraft coverage 
should not be a feature for the GPR prepaid card.  As indicated earlier, consumers elect to 
use the GPR prepaid card, in part, to avoid overspending. Herbst-Murphy & Weed, supra 
note 38. Allowing an overdraft feature on a GPR prepaid card would eliminate this feature 
and significantly increase the costs of this popular checking account alternative.  Recent ex-
periences with a credit feature on a GPR prepaid card may provide sufficient evidence of the 
problems that might arise if the product is burdened with too many features. 
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B. The CFPB’s authority to supervise “covered persons” offering 
consumer financial products 
Section 1024 of Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB broad supervisory 
and enforcement authority over “covered persons,”166 which includes a 
person who: 
 
[T]he Bureau has reasonable cause to determine, by order, after 
notice to the covered person and a reasonable opportunity for 
such covered person to respond, based on complaints collected 
through the system . . . or information from other sources, that 
such covered person is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that 
poses risks to consumers with regard to the offering or provision 
of consumer financial products or services . . . .167 
 
Interpreting this section, the CFPB issued a final rule in July 2013 
establishing a procedure for determining when the CFPB might exercise 
authority over a person under Section 1024.168  When explaining the 
background for the rule, the CFPB noted that one of Congress’ objectives 
for the CFPB is to ensure that consumer financial products are regulated 
consistently without regard to the issuer of the product.169 
Accordingly, Section 1024(a)(1)(C) could be used to exercise 
supervisory and enforcement authority over banks and nonbanks issuing 
GPR prepaid cards.  By opening the complaint system to consumer reports 
about their experience with prepaid cards on July 2014,170 the CFPB has 
established an avenue for gathering complaints and other information 
needed to exercise its authority under § 1024(a)(1)(C).  In order to act, the 
 
 166.  “Covered persons” are defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing 
a consumer financial product or service” and “any affiliate of a person described [above] if 
such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.”  12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2013).  See 
generally Dylan J. Castellino, Note, A Spotlight on Shadow Banking: The CFPB Finalizes 
Procedures to Supervise Risky Nonbanks, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 336-40 (2014) (ex-
plaining that the CFPB also is authorized to supervise (1) nonbank covered persons that of-
fer (a) origination, brokerage or serving of loans secured by real estate used as a personal 
residence, (b) private education loans, (c) payday loans; and (2) larger participants in the 
market for other types of consumer financial products).   
 167.  Dodd Frank § 1024(a)(1)(C), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C).   
 168.  Procedural Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority over Certain Nonbank Covered 
Persons Based on Risk Determination, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,352 (July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1091). 
 169.  Id.  
 170.  CFPB Begins Accepting Consumer Complaints on Prepaid Cards and Additional 
Nonbank Products, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (Aug. 1 2014, 11:21 PM), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-begins-accepting-consumer-complaints-
on-prepaid-cards-and-additional-nonbank-products/. 
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CFPB must find that the product causes a “risk to consumer[s].”171  The 
CFPB refused to define this phrase in its final rule.172  However, the Bureau 
indicated that when providing notice to a “covered person” it would 
consider whether the product or conduct was “potentially unfair, deceptive 
or abusive” or “potentially violates applicable Federal consumer financial 
law.”173  Accordingly, assuming the CFPB extends Regulation E to GPR 
prepaid cards, the focus turns to whether the distribution of a prepaid card 
without deposit insurance is an “unfair, deceptive or abusive” practice.174 
C. The CFPB’s UDAAP Authority 
Determining whether distribution of a GPR prepaid product, with a 
maximum load of $10,000, without deposit insurance constitutes an 
“unfair, deceptive or abusive” practice is based on whether a consumer can 
truly appreciate the significance of FDIC protection.  The CFPB may use 
its authority under Section 1031(d) of Dodd-Frank to prevent unfair, 
deceptive or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP) to regulate the GPR 
prepaid card product.  Section 1031(d) provides: 
 
The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or 
service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with 
a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the 
 
 171.  Dodd Frank § 1024(a)(1)(C), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C). 
 172.  Procedural Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority over Certain Nonbank Covered 
Persons Based on Risk Determination, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,357 (July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1091) (reporting that the CFPB determined that defining “risks to consumers” 
was “beyond the scope of the final rule”).  
 173.  Id.  Section 1022’s broad language, allowing the agency to issue rules, orders and 
guidance, could also be used by the Bureau to signal the type of product or services that are 
acceptable before any formal enforcement steps are taken.  12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1) (2013). 
 174.  Ongoing supervision of non-bank GPR prepaid card issuers pursuant to Section 
1024 may not be necessary in light of enactment of the “Money Remittances Improvement 
Act” sponsored by Senator Keith Ellison.  Money Remittances Improvement Act of 2014, 
H.R. 4386, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted).  This legislation allows federal regulators to rely 
on reports on money service businesses from state regulators.  As stated above, some states 
regard a non-bank issuer of prepaid cards as subject to the money transmitter license statute.  
See Cordray, supra note 137 and accompanying text.  Once it receives a license, the entity 
will be subject to periodic examination by state regulators.  Whether or not the entity is sub-
ject to state law, the business is also deemed to be a money services business (MSB) subject 
to regulation by FinCEN for compliance with money laundering rules.  See Gregory, supra 
note 75.  Thus, the new law simply allows FinCEN and other federal regulators to rely on 
the examinations conducted by state regulators.  The legislation will ease the regulatory 
burden on both the businesses and eliminate duplicative efforts by government agencies.  
Thus, while the “day-to-day” oversight of non-bank entities could be addressed in this man-
ner, the CFPB’s authority under Section 1024 could be more limited. 
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offering of a consumer financial product or service. Rules under 
this section may include requirements for the purpose of 
preventing such acts or practices.175 
 
The language of the statute suggests that the focus is on products and 
services directed at consumers and thus includes the GPR prepaid card.  
While Senator Menendez’ proposed legislation clearly requires deposit 
insurance for all spending accounts and eliminates the need to engage in 
any analysis of the CFPB’s UDAAP authority,176 Congressional action is 
painstakingly slow and could derail agency action directed at closing the 
current regulatory gap as Congress did eighteen years ago when the Federal 
Reserve attempted to regulate stored value cards.177 
Federal agencies have utilized their power to prohibit “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” for a number of years.178  GPR prepaid 
programs, however, have been subject to federal enforcement actions on 
only a few occasions.  Notably, in May 2013, the FDIC, a banking 
regulator, issued Consent Orders involving Achieve Financial Services and 
First California Bank.  Without admitting or denying any violation of law, 
the entities consented to the issuance of separate consent orders.  Under the 
orders, certain compliance steps were initiated, a $1.1 million restitution 
fund was set up and a civil money penalty was levied.179 The orders 
mentioned unfair and deceptive practices in violation of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act and violations of the Treasury rule concerning the delivery of 
federal benefit payments to a prepaid card.”180  The FDIC also mentioned a 
 
 175.  12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (2013). 
    176.   Section 3 of Sen. Menendez’ bill expressly requires FDIC (or NCUA) deposit in-
surance for the funds underlying the spending account.  It also requires that the funds under-
lying the prepaid account be placed in an insured depository institution within one day of 
receipt, stating: 
TRANSFER OF FUNDS – Any person that receives funds in connection with an 
electronic fund transfer to a spending account shall promptly, and in no event 
later than 1 business day after the funds are activated— (A) transfer such funds 
to an account at an insured depository institution or an insured credit union, as 
applicable; and (B) credit the spending account in an amount equal to the 
amounts of such funds. 
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. 
 178.  Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act grants the FTC authority to bring 
enforcement actions against those that engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). A summary of the FTC’s 
enforcement actions is available on the agency’s website.  See generally Enforcement, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last visited May 8, 2015). 
 179.  See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing restitution and civil penalty 
consent orders). 
 180.  Both parties agreed to the Consent Orders without admitting or denying any viola-
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prepaid card program when it issued a Consent Order against The Bancorp 
Bank for engaging in unsafe and unsound practices in matters related to the 
bank’s compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.181  As a part of the Consent 
Order, the bank could not establish any new contractual relations for 
prepaid card programs until specific compliance matters were addressed.182  
In 2009, the FTC settled with VirtualWorks, LLC for deceptively enrolling 
customers in their GPR prepaid program without their consent,183 and in 
2007, using its UDAAP authority, the FTC agreed to a $2.2 million 
settlement in an action against EDebitPay for deceptively advertising its 
GPR prepaid card as “no cost” when it was charging $9.95 per month for 
the card.184  Although the agencies used different statutory authorities in 
these enforcement actions, they provide some insights about the ability of 
the CFPB to utilize its UDAAP authority. 
Based on these proceedings, the CFPB could initiate a UDAAP 
enforcement action if it finds that a GPR prepaid card is mislabeled–
assuring the customer that FDIC insurance is available when no steps or 
improper steps have been taken to comply with the FDIC’s requirements in 
the FDIC’s General Counsel’s Opinion No. 8.185  Under these 
circumstances, the facts would be very similar to any situation involving a 
material misrepresentation.  This approach would be less intrusive to 
prepaid card businesses.  Yet, it would allow a second-class consumer 
financial product to exist in the marketplace.  As long as the product was 
properly labeled as lacking deposit insurance, no enforcement action would 
be pursued.  Arguably, this approach does not seem to be the best way to 
offer this consumer protection feature. 
The CFPB’s UDAAP authority, however, is broader than the 
powers extended to the FTC.  In contrast to the FTC’s power, the CFPB 
may take action against practices that are “unfair”, “deceptive” or 
“abusive.”  While there is little understanding in the consumer finance 
 
tion of federal law. In re First Cal. Bank, Westlake Vill., Cal., No. FDIC-13-046b, FDIC-
13-047k (May 28, 2013) (Consent Order for Restitution and Order to Pay Civil Money Pen-
alty) (the order included a $600,000 civil money penalty against the bank); In re Achieve 
Fin. Servs., No. FDIC-13-048b, FDIC-13-049k (May 28, 2013) (Consent Order for Restitu-
tion and Order to Pay Civil Money Penalty) (including a $110,000 civil money penalty). 
 181. In re Bancorp Bank, Wilmington, Del., No. FDIC-13-0479b, at 5 (June 5, 2014) 
(Consent Order). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Bars Deceptive Online Mar-
keting Tactics; Payday Loan Applicants Were Charged for Unwanted Debit Cards (Aug. 20, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 184.  FTC v. EDebitPay, No. CV-07-4880, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122126, at *7, *11 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008), aff’d, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18206 (9th Cir. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012). 
 185.  Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Ac-
cess Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,155 (Nov. 13, 2008). 
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industry about the meaning of the term “abusive” the authority could be 
used to craft the essential features of a GPR prepaid card product.  
“Abusive” is defined in Dodd-Frank as an act or practice that: 
 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to 
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or 
service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of– 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer 
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or 
service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests 
of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial 
product or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer.186 
 
CFPB offered a few insights about its interpretation of this provision in a 
July 2013 Bulletin.187  The Bulletin describes conduct that might constitute 
a UDAAP, but advises that additional guidance will be provided as it 
exercises its UDAAP power through enforcement proceedings.188  The 
CFPB’s use of this authority in enforcement proceedings to date has been 
limited.189 
When applying the statutory definition of “abusive,” the CFPB 
must focus on the ability of the consumer to understand and take steps to 
avoid the risks associated with the lack of deposit insurance.  The analysis 
begins by recognizing that the “unbanked and underbanked” are a key 
market for the new product.  Hayashi and Cuddy mapped the penetration 
rates of prepaid cards in NetSpend’s program and found that “the shares of 
unbanked and underbanked households and prepaid card penetration rates 
 
 186.  12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2013).  
 187.  CONSUMER PROT. FIN. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2013-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR, 
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS 
(2013). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Recently, the CFPB invoked this power, declaring action by a predatory lending 
collection agency as “abusive” and fining the organization $10 million.  Jim Puzzanghera, 
Payday Lender Will Pay $10 Million to Settle Consumer Bureau’s Claims, L.A. TIMES, July 
10, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-payday-lender-settlement-20140711-
story.html.  In early July 2014, the CFPB settled litigation against ACE Cash Express for 
“abusive” practices in connection with payday loans.  Id.  The complaint alleged that the 
company used abusive practices when making collection efforts against delinquent borrow-
ers.  Id.  Under the settlement, the company will pay $10 million.  Id. 
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are positively correlated.”190 Thus, it seems counterintuitive to the efforts to 
assist millions of unbanked Americans to permit widespread distribution of 
a consumer financial product that is not protected with federal deposit 
insurance.  Applying the statute, the CFPB could find that a GPR prepaid 
card without deposit insurance would be “abusive” because it is 
affirmatively marketed, at least in part, to those who face obstacles to 
selecting an alternative financial product for routine expenses. 
Any “abusive” analysis must also recognize, as outlined above,191 
that the average consumer is unable to effectively evaluate or monitor a 
GPR prepaid card program.  Information about the program’s compliance 
with the FDIC’s guidelines for assuring deposit insurance would not be 
available at the time the card is purchased, so the consumer could not 
reasonably avoid the risks by simply reading the packaging.  In fact, it is 
unlikely that the consumer could thoroughly identify and assess the 
potential risks in a GPR prepaid program.  Since 1886, federal and state 
governments have worked to protect the savings and “hard earned” income 
of Americans.  Technological changes in the way consumer financial 
products are delivered to consumers do not change the underlying rationale 
for this important consumer protection.  Consumer experiences to date 
support a determination that consumers are at significant risk if a consumer 
financial product designed as a checking account on a card lacks deposit 
insurance, a feature that has protected the earnings and savings of 
Americans for decades.  Thus, under either the “unfair” prong or the 
“abusive” prong, an entity offering an unsafe consumer financial product 
without deposit insurance would be subject to oversight pursuant to Section 
1024(a)(1)(C) or an enforcement proceeding pursuant to Section 1031(d). 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) repeatedly take 
actions against companies for failure to install safety devices or to require 
safety procedures.  Even the current privacy debate is focused, in part, on 
the affirmative steps merchants must take to design computer systems that 
prevent or reduce harms to consumers.  Accordingly, the CFPB may use its 
UDAAP authority to prevent an unsafe product without important 
consumer protections from becoming a mainstream consumer financial 
product.  In other words, if the CFPB amends Regulation E to incorporate 
GPR prepaid cards, the CFPB could initiate a UDAAP enforcement action 
against any GPR prepaid card issuer offering a product that does not offer 
deposit insurance.  However, enforcement actions against non-conforming 
prepaid card issuers would be time-consuming and costly.  Therefore, 
 
 190.  Fumiko Hayashi & Emily Cuddy, General Purpose Reloadable Prepaid Cards: 
Penetration, Use, Fees and Fraud Risks 11 tbl. 3.1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Kan. City, Working 
Paper No. 14-01, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398607. 
 191.  See supra Part III.A-B.  
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although a single enforcement would likely provide sufficient motivation to 
impact the architecture of all GPR prepaid card programs, the CFPB has 
the ability to issue guidance bulletins.192  Accordingly, the CFPB should 
issue a guidance requiring all “covered persons” to structure GPR prepaid 
card programs in a manner that ensures deposit insurance for all 
consumers.193 
CONCLUSION 
General purpose reloadable prepaid cards are part of a larger trend 
toward a cashless society.  This market offers significant benefits to both 
traditional depository institutions and the new non-bank entrants in the 
payments industry.  Electronic transfers significantly reduce the costs 
associated with paper-based payment systems.  However, GPR prepaid 
cards must offer consumer protections so consumers do not become the 
sole bearers of the risks inherent in any payment system.  Simple 
protections, like those traditionally afforded to mainstream banking clients 
using checking accounts and debit cards, must be adopted for the GPR 
prepaid product to ensure long-term product safety for consumers. Current 
law, including both the EFTA and Dodd-Frank, gives the CFPB the 
authority to ensure that the GPR prepaid product offers the same consumer 
protections, deposit insurance and Regulation E protections, as similar 
products.  
 
   192.   See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. NO. 2014-02, BULLETIN ON 
MARKETING OF CREDIT CARD PROMOTIONAL APR OFFERS (2014) (offering guidance to low-
er the risk of deceptive or abusive practices by all industry participants). 
 193.  Alternatively, the CFPB could use its broad supervisory powers over larger non-
bank participants in financial markets to establish consumer protections for GPR prepaid 
cards.  12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).   To date, the CFPB has identified debt collectors 
and credit reporting agencies as entities subject to its “larger participant” authority.  12 
C.F.R. § 1090.  Arguably, this power to regulate larger participants could extend to nonbank 
payment service providers, including participants in the GPR prepaid card programs.  While 
it is too early to predict the movement of the payments industry, if payment activities are 
broken away from the traditional banking system, this supervisory power might be neces-
sary for non-bank participants in the payments industry.  
